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Charter Remedies and Jurisdiction
to Grant Them: The Evolution of
Section 24(1) and Section 52(1)
Debra M. McAllister*

Without effective remedies, the law becomes an empty symbol; full of
sound and fury but signifying nothing…
Chief Justice Beverley M. McLachlin**

I. INTRODUCTION
A right is only as good as the remedy; this adage is as true of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 19821 (“the Charter”) as it is
of any other area of the law. However, many courts and administrative

*
Senior Counsel, Department of Justice Canada, Ontario Regional Office, Toronto.
The views expressed in this paper are mine alone; I do not purport to represent, in any way,
the views of the Department of Justice or the Government of Canada. I presented a shorter
predecessor of this paper entitled “Doucet-Boudreau Judicial Enforcement of Court Orders:
Confrontation or Cooperation?” at the Osgoode 2003 Constitutional Cases Conference on
April 2, 2004. Further, some portions of this article initially appeared in my publications
entitled: “Mackin: Of Sterile Rules and Real People” (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 339;
Taking the Charter to Court: A Practitioners Analysis, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1998)
c. 16.1, 16.4; “Administrative Tribunals and the Charter: A Tale of Form Conquering Substance” [1992] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 131; and “The Role of Tribunals in Constitutional
Adjudication” [1991-1992] 1 N.J.C.L. 25.
**
Extract from McLachlin C.J., “The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary?” (1991)
29 Alta. L. Rev. 540 (paper delivered on October 16, 1990, for the Weir Memorial Lecture at
the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta). Although McLachlin C.J. was not the Chief
Justice when the speech was delivered, I have referred to her throughout this paper by her
current designation. All other references to judges are “as they then were”; that is, by their
designation at the time they wrote a specific decision or paper.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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tribunals that routinely deal with Charter issues do not have authority to
grant effective remedies for breach of Charter rights. The issue of what
remedies are available to rectify a breach of Charter rights, and the question of what bodies have jurisdiction to determine whether the Charter
has been infringed, are intertwined and have been controversial and
central to Charter litigation from the beginning.
The jurisprudence on many constitutional issues has evolved so
quickly since the Charter came into force in 1982, that some rulings in
the Supreme Court of Canada’s earliest Charter decisions have already
been reversed or substantially revised.2 However, this apparent growth
in our understanding of rights can be tested by examining the remedies
that have developed, since the remedy is the “bottom line” that matters
most to the claimant at the end of the day. In other words, while it is
certainly important that the courts have taken an expansive approach to
equality rights, this may not matter to an individual who cannot get a
remedy that fully and meaningfully vindicates her section 15 rights. The
issue addressed in this paper is how far have we come with respect to
remedies for breaches of Charter rights? To paraphrase McLachlin C.J.,
do we have effective remedies? If not, we risk the Charter becoming an
empty symbol.
This question cannot be answered without exploring the twin issue
of jurisdiction. The two constitutional provisions that deal with both

2
See, for example, Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova
Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54
[hereinafter “Martin”], which made important changes to earlier jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to decide Charter issues, and specifically overruled Cooper
v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (sub nom. Bell v. Canada (Human Rights Commission)), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, [1996] S.C.J. No. 115 [hereinafter “Cooper”] to the extent of any
inconsistency. See also the development of the s. 15(1) test beginning with the 1989 trilogy of
Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6; Reference re Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfoundland) (sub nom. Reference re Sections
32 & 34 of the Workers’ Compensation Act 1983 (Newfoundland)), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922,
[1989] S.C.J. No. 35; and R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47; followed
by the 1995 trilogy of Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44; Egan v.
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, [1995] S.C.J. NO. 43 [hereinafter “Egan”], and Thibaudeau v.
Canada (sub nom. Thibaudeau v. R.; Thibaudeau v. Minister of National Revenue), [1995] 2
S.C.R. 627, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42; and ultimately stabilized in the 1999 decision in Law v.
Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12.
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jurisdiction and remedial authority are section 24(1) of the Charter and
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,3 which provide as follows:
24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter,
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate
and just in the circumstances.
52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is,
to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.

Not only are jurisdiction and remedies addressed in the same sections of the Constitution; they are bound together in practice. A Charter
claimant must consider what remedy is needed, and what forum has
jurisdiction to grant that remedy. Conversely, an individual may be
required by statute to appear before a court or tribunal that lacks jurisdiction to grant an effective remedy.
The Charter has posed unique challenges for the courts with respect
to both their decision-making process and their remedial authority that
did not exist before our rights were constitutionally entrenched. These
challenges, which impact upon the relationship between the courts and
the legislative and executive branches of government, were discussed in
McLachlin C.J.’s paper entitled “The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary,”4 which was delivered for the Weir Memorial Lecture at the University of Alberta in 1990. I begin with a summary of this paper, and of
the academic commentary and case law on the dialogue theory5 of Charter development, since both provide insight into the relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of government in the Charter
era. This is the context within which remedial and jurisdictional issues
will be explored.

3
I do not attempt to deal with the entire body of jurisprudence on s. 24(2) of the
Charter in this article.
4
(1991) 29 No. 3 Alta. L. Rev. 540 .
5
The dialogue theory was first proposed by Hogg & Bushell in an article entitled
“The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights
Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [hereinafter “Hogg &
Bushell”].
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I begin this exploration with a review of the Supreme Court’s early
decisions that articulated the foundational principles for the interpretation
of section 24(1) and section 52(1): R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985)6
and R. v. Mills (1986).7 These cases establish that the Charter does not
expand jurisdiction or create remedies. Further, section 52(1) applies
when legislation is challenged, while section 24(1) provides personal
remedies for government action that infringes Charter rights. I also
review the cases which state that a remedy under section 24(1) is not
generally available in conjunction with a section 52(1) remedy:
Schachter v. Canada (1985),8 Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General)
(1996),9 and Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance) (sub nom.
Rice v. New Brunswick) (2002).10
Next, I address the guidelines provided by the Supreme Court for
granting section 52(1) remedies, which are set out in Schachter (1985)11
and Vriend v. Alberta (1998).12 I also deal with the jurisdiction to grant
these remedies, which was considered in a series of cases culminating in
Martin (2003).13 Similarly, I explore the principles for granting a remedy under section 24(1) that were established in Doucet-Boudreau v.
Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) (2003),14 and jurisdiction under
section 24(1) as it has been explained in the case law, particularly
Dunedin (2001)15 and Doucet-Boudreau SCC.16
My thesis is that there have been substantial developments in the
principles and guidelines regarding both remedies for breach of Charter
rights, and the jurisdiction to grant them. However, we do not yet have a
6

[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17 [hereinafter “Big M”].
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39 [hereinafter “Mills”].
8
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68 [hereinafter “Schachter”].
9
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 347, [1996] S.C.J. No. 91 [hereinafter “Guimond”].
10
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, [2002] S.C.J. No. 13 [hereinafter “Mackin”].
11
Supra, note 8.
12
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29 [hereinafter “Vriend ”].
13
Supra, note 2.
14
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, [2003] S.C.J. No. 63 [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau SCC”]. I
have distinguished throughout this paper between the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Doucet-Boudreau, and those of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal.
15
Ontario v. 974649 Ontario Inc. (sub nom. R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc.), [2001] 3
S.C.R. 575, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81 [hereinafter “Dunedin”]. See also the companion case of R.
v. Hynes, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 623, [2001] S.C.J. No. 82.
16
Supra, note 14.
7
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cohesive set of principles that will ensure that a person whose Charter
rights have been infringed will be granted a just and appropriate remedy
in an expeditious manner. There are gaps in the law, particularly where
statutory courts and administrative tribunals are concerned; these bodies
may have the duty to abide by and apply the Constitution, but many do
not have authority to grant a remedy that will do justice to the claimant.
The courts cannot provide a complete solution, since the assignment of
jurisdiction is entirely a matter for the legislatures. However, the courts
can point out the problem and urge the legislatures to take up the issue
in a manner that respects the division of powers among the branches of
government as it has developed since the Charter was enacted.17

II. THE ROLE OF COURTS UNDER THE CHARTER
Chief Justice McLachlin delivered the Weir Memorial Lecture18 in
1990, eight years after the Charter came into force.19 She discussed the
fundamental changes the Charter made to the role of Canadian courts,
and how the courts might deal with these changes. She addressed the
difficulties in the decision-making process that flowed from lack of
precedents, the “open-textured” language of the Charter, and the need
for value-based decisions. She also considered remedies, and how the
courts could enforce the new range of Charter rights and freedoms. In
the pre-Charter era there was generally no difficulty enforcing court
orders; legal disputes were between individuals, the Crown was supreme, and the courts were seen as an independent emanation of the
Crown. However, under the Charter the issues are between individuals
and the state, and the concern is how the courts can ensure their orders
will be enforced when they decide that legislation or state action is

17

I wish to acknowledge and thank Professor Marilyn Pilkington for this suggestion,
which we discussed at the Osgoode 2003 Constitutional Cases Conference on April 2, 2004.
Professor Pilkington and I appeared along with Professor Kent Roach on a panel addressing
the Doucet-Boudreau decision. I would also like to thank Professor Roach for his very helpful
comments on recent trends in remedies, particularly the focus on discretion.
18
Supra, note 4.
19
All provisions of the Charter except s. 15 came into force in 1982. By virtue of
s. 32(2) of the Charter, s. 15 came into force three years later, on April 17, 1985.
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unconstitutional. “The answer,” McLachlin C.J. said, “must be found in
respect, tradition and constitutional convention.”20
Her comments were made against the background of the American
constitutional experience. Although there is no express authority for
judicial review, the United States Supreme Court developed this power
beginning with the landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison.21 When
“the Court began taking on an activist approach, particularly when [it]
attempted to fashion remedies in civil rights cases, it met resistance and
sometimes open defiance from lower courts, the bureaucracy and the
executive.”22 The Court’s school desegregation decision in Brown v.
Board of Education23 provides a vivid example. The bureaucracy was
uncooperative, and the government failed to provide the funds needed to
implement the decision. Congress, the Senate and state legislatures
responded by enacting statutes that complied with the letter but not the
substance of the decision, or by passing constitutional amendments.
Legislators verbally attacked judges, Congress altered the Court’s mandate, and presidents attempted to “stack” the Court with politically
aligned appointees.
Some lower courts avoided or defied the Supreme Court’s decision.
At the opposite extreme, judges responded by “giving detailed, literal
orders, virtually taking over the administration of schools or dictating
the development of desegregated housing. The result was judge as administrator… making day to day operational decisions in the running of
a school — down to what kind of tennis balls to order in one case …”24
Although the courts ultimately prevailed, a high price was paid in delay,
frustration, additional costs, strained relationships between lower courts
and the Supreme Court, and hostility between the legislative and judicial
branches of government. Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that the
verdict on judicial administration was mixed at best, which made it an
alternative that Canada should not lightly embrace.
Further, she pointed out that there are fundamental differences between the American and Canadian constitutional systems that should
avoid these difficulties. First, Canada’s courts have explicit authority to
20
21
22
23
24

Supra, note 4, at 549.
1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Supra, note 4, at 550.
347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Supra, note 4, at 552-53.
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review legislation and government action, and to grant remedies under
section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and section 24 of the Charter.
These powers were granted to the courts by the legislatures, which retained ultimate control through the legislative override in section 33 of
the Charter. Another major difference is the tradition of references that
permit Parliament or the legislatures to ask a court’s advice on legal
issues. Although the results are not binding, the Supreme Court’s decisions on references have always been followed. Chief Justice McLachlin
wrote that this was an example of “a long-standing tradition of communication between the executive and judicial branches”25 of government.
However, she considered the most significant difference from the
United States to be the Canadian tradition of judicial restraint and cooperation between the judiciary and the legislatures. Judicial restraint
means that judges normally answer only the question that is directly
before them. “Broad sweeping directives have not been part of our judicial history… [The Supreme Court] has generally refrained from activism where it was not necessary to do so.”26 This is based on the division
of powers and respect among the branches of government. Professor
Hogg explained that “…if a case can be decided on a narrow constitutional ground or a wide ground, the narrow ground is to be preferred…
the general idea is that a proper deference to the other branches of government makes it wise for the courts, as far as possible, to frame their
decisions in ways that do not intrude gratuitously on the powers of the
other branches.”27 Similarly, McLachlin C.J. wrote that our courts “remain concerned not to trench too much on the legislative role.” Even
though the Court’s function under the Charter is necessarily more activist, it maintains “the attitude of judicial restraint and respect for Parliament and the Legislatures.”28
The underlying concern is that even though the Canadian Constitution does not establish a strict division of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, rules have
developed over time to define the jurisdictional boundary between the
executive and legislative branches on one hand, and the courts on the
25

Id., at 556.
Id., at 555.
Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997)
Vol. 2, at 56-21.
28
Supra, note 4, at 555.
26
27
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other. Before the Charter, Canadian courts had limited authority to strike
down laws that were ultra vires the powers of the enacting body. Today,
they have jurisdiction to review legislation and government activities for
compliance with a broad range of fundamental rights and freedoms. The
question at the heart of the Weir Memorial Lecture is, what if the courts
find a law invalid or hold that government activity is unconstitutional,
and the government does nothing to rectify the situation?
To take this concern a step further, it has been argued that the constitutional balance between the courts and the legislatures has shifted;
judicial appointees who are not accountable to the electorate have ventured into the domain of the legislatures by striking down laws enacted
by democratically chosen representatives of the people. The significance
of this issue is reflected in the number of times the Supreme Court has
responded to this allegation, beginning with its earliest Charter decisions. The Court has repeatedly stated that Parliament and the legislatures specifically assigned and entrusted adjudication of Charter issues
to the judiciary.29
For example, the majority in Vriend30 held that our elected representatives made deliberate choices to require the legislative and executive
branches to perform their roles in conformity with the Charter. The
same representatives made the courts the trustees of Charter rights and
freedoms, with explicit authority to interpret these rights, resolve disputes, and declare legislation invalid if it is unconstitutional.31 However,
courts must not “second-guess legislatures and the executives … [or]
make value judgments on what they regard as the proper policy choice;
this is for the other branches… respect by the courts for the legislature
and executive role is as important as ensuring that the other branches
respect each others’ role and the role of the courts.”32

29

See, for example, Reference re s. 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia)
(sub nom. Reference re Constitutional Question Act (British Columbia), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, at 497, where Lamer J. stated that the courts had authority to review the
content of laws in division of powers cases, and that our elected representatives “extended the
scope of constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous
responsibility.”
30
Supra, note 12. The government argued that the Court was interfering with the legislature’s choice not to include sexual orientation in the provincial human rights legislation.
31
Id.
32
Id., at 564-65, para. 136.
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This relationship between the courts and the legislatures was described by Professor Hogg and Allison Bushell as a dialogue33 in their
1997 study of cases where laws were struck down by the Supreme Court
for Charter violations. They concluded that, “[i]n the majority of cases,
the Court’s ruling was followed by new legislation that accomplished
the same legislative objective but with some new civil libertarian safeguards to accommodate the Court’s ruling.”34 They described this pattern as a dialogue, meaning that “ss. 1 and 33 of the Charter … usually
allow room for a legislative reaction to a Court decision, and a legislative reaction is indeed usually forthcoming.”35 Professor Hogg argues
that judicial review under the Charter is not incompatible with democracy, which requires more than simple majoritarian rule. “In a flourishing democracy, the rights of individuals and minorities should be
respected even against the wishes of a majority,”36 and the public dialogue that follows a court decision usually leads to a valid law with
better rights protection.
The dialogue theory has been adopted by the Supreme Court. The
majority in Vriend held that “the Charter has given rise to a more dynamic interaction among the branches of governance”37 which enhances
the democratic process. “In reviewing legislative enactments and executive decisions to ensure constitutional validity, the courts speak to the
legislative and executive branches … most of the legislation held not to
pass constitutional muster has been followed by new legislation designed to accomplish similar objectives … By doing this, the legislature
responds to the courts; hence the dialogue among the branches.”38 Each
branch is accountable to the other through this process, which has enhanced democratic values.39 Further, the judicial branch must observe

33

Hogg & Bushell, supra, note 5.
Hogg, “Dialogue and Democracy” in McAllister & Dodek, eds., The Charter at
Twenty: Law and Practice 2002 (Toronto: Ontario Bar Association, 2003) 483, at 487.
35
Id.
36
Id., at 483. This point was also made in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, [1999]
S.C.J. No. 68, at para. 58.
37
Supra, note 12, at 565, para. 138.
38
Id.
39
Id., at 566-67, paras. 139-42.
34

10

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the boundaries of its institutional competence, and defer to legislatures
in areas where they are better able to make policy decisions.40
As McLachlin C.J. stated in the Weir Memorial Lecture, the courts
must necessarily be more activist under the Charter. That activism was
especially evident in cases where the Supreme Court ordered governments to rectify underinclusive laws41 and to expand health care programs.42 It was also apparent in Dunmore (2001)43 where the Court
struck down legislation that repealed a law which brought historically
excluded workers into the labour relations regime. In response to decisions like this, legislatures have enacted new laws that achieve the same
purpose, with added safeguards to protect Charter rights as interpreted
by the courts. This dialogue relationship builds upon the tradition of
judicial restraint and respect for the division of powers among the
branches of government. It forms the essential context within which
to consider remedies in Charter cases and the jurisdiction to grant
them, especially the question whether Canadian courts should issue

40
M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 78-79, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23. See also R. v.
Mills, supra, note 36, at para. 55.
41
The clearest example is Vriend, supra, note 12, at 567-79, paras. 145-79, where Alberta repeatedly declined to add sexual orientation to the proscribed grounds of discrimination in its comprehensive anti-discrimination law. Indeed, the Alberta government indicated
that it would not pass legislation to add sexual orientation to its human rights code, since the
issue would be resolved through litigation. The Supreme Court, id., at 575-76, para. 171, took
this as “an express invitation for the courts to read sexual orientation into the [Act]” if its
exclusion violated the Charter.
42
See Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, [1997]
S.C.J. No. 86 [hereinafter “Eldridge”], where the province failed to provide funding for sign
language interpreters for deaf persons receiving medical services. See also the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney
General) 2002 BCCA 538, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) vi,
[2002] B.C.J. No. 2258, where the Court ordered the province to fund a particular type of
therapy for children with autism.
43
See Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, [2001] S.C.J.
No. 87, where the majority held that to make freedom to organize meaningful, s. 2(d) may
impose a positive obligation on the state to extend labour relations legislation to include
unprotected groups where the excluded groups establish that they could not otherwise organize effectively. The minimum requirement in this case was to give agricultural workers the
statutory freedom to organize under the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, and the
protections that were essential for the meaningful exercise of the freedom to organize.
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administrative injunctions similar to those granted by American courts
in civil rights cases.44

III. BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR INTERPRETING
SECTION 24(1) AND SECTION 52(1)
The basic principles for interpretation of section 52(1) and section
24(1) were set out in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.45 and R. v. Mills,46
which were decided in 1985 and 1986 respectively. Both cases involved
the jurisdiction of provincial criminal courts to grant remedies for
breach of Charter rights. In Big M, a company was charged with selling
goods in violation of Sunday closing legislation. The Provincial Court
judge who presided at trial held the statute was unconstitutional, partly
on the basis that it violated freedom of religion. In Mills, the issue was
whether a Provincial Court judge sitting on a preliminary inquiry was a
court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a stay of
proceedings to remedy the breach of the accused’s right to be tried
within a reasonable time.
The first significant point drawn from these decisions is found in
Mills, where McIntyre J. commented that the jurisdiction of Canadian
courts is fixed by the legislatures and Parliament, and is wholly outside
the reach of the courts themselves. Since there are no jurisdictional
provisions or remedies prescribed in the Constitution Act, 1982, McIntyre J. concluded that the Charter “was not intended to turn the Canadian legal system upside down. What is required rather is that it be fitted
into the existing scheme of Canadian legal procedure. There is no need
for special procedures and rules to give it full and adequate effect.”47 He
added that “… s. 24(1) does not create courts of competent jurisdiction,
but merely vests additional powers in courts which are already found to
be competent independently of the Charter.”48
The second basic principle that emerges from these early decisions
is set out in the majority decision of Dickson J. in Big M. He granted a
44

The appropriate roles of courts and legislatures was explored in greater detail in
Doucet-Boudreau SCC, supra, note 14, a point to which I will return later in this paper.
45
Supra, note 6.
46
Supra, note 7.
47
Id., at 952-53.
48
Id., at 960.
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declaration under section 52(1) that the Sunday closing legislation was
invalid, and dismissed the charges under section 24(1). He held that
while section 24(1) establishes a remedy for individuals whose Charter
rights have been infringed, there is no need to resort to this provision if
legislation is challenged. Section 52 “sets out the fundamental principle
… that the Constitution is supreme. The undoubted corollary … is that
no one can be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional
law…”49 While the Provincial Court could not grant a declaration of
invalidity under section 24(1), it could rely on the principle of supremacy of the Constitution set out in section 52(1) and dismiss charges laid
under an unconstitutional law.
The third principle regarding the interpretation of these provisions is
articulated in Mills. The accused did not challenge legislation; rather,
the actions of government officials resulted in the breach of his right to
trial within a reasonable time. Consequently, section 52(1) was not
engaged, since there was no legislation that could be inconsistent with
the Constitution of Canada, and the accused had to rely on section 24(1)
for a remedy. Justice McIntyre stated that “… a court is competent if it
has jurisdiction, conferred by statute, over the person and the subject
matter in question and, in addition, has authority to make the order
sought.”50 Therefore, if there is no challenge to legislation, section 24(1)
will govern, and the test in Mills of jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter, as well as authority to grant the order sought, will apply.
In summary, Big M and Mills establish that the Charter does not expand jurisdiction or create remedies, and that Charter issues must be
raised within the existing legal framework. Secondly, section 52(1)
codifies the principle that laws which are inconsistent with the Constitution are invalid. It applies when legislation is challenged, and when an
accused is charged under an invalid law. Third, section 24(1) provides
personal remedies for government action that infringes Charterprotected rights. This provision must be relied upon when there is no
legislation at issue. To qualify as a section 24(1) court of competent
49

Supra, note 6, at 313. This approach to criminal charges under unconstitutional legislation was established before the Charter was enacted. See, for example, R. v. Boggs (sub
nom. R. v. Akey), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 49 and R. v. Westendorp, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43.
50
Mills, supra, note 7, at 960. Justice McIntyre adopted the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
approach in R. v. Morgentaler (1984), 41 C.R. (3d) 262, at 271 (Ont. C.A.). The other judges
agreed. See Lamer J., at 890 and La Forest J., at 971.
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jurisdiction, the decision maker must have authority over the person and
the subject matter, as well as power to grant the remedy sought.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 24(1) AND
SECTION 52(1)
While these early statements provided a starting point for the interpretation of section 52(1) and section 24(1), the relationship between
these provisions was not clarified until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Schachter51 was released in 1992. The Court held that a remedy under
section 24(1) is not generally available in conjunction with a section
52(1) remedy.52 The subsequent decisions in Guimond (1996)53 and
Mackin (2002)54 established that concurrent remedies under these provisions will be available only where the government conduct amounts to
bad faith or abuse of process. The Supreme Court recently commented
on this line of authorities in R. v. Demers.55
Schachter was a challenge to the maternity and parental benefits
available under the unemployment insurance regime. The legislation
provided maternity benefits for biological mothers, and parental benefits
for adoptive fathers or mothers, but no comparable benefits for biological fathers. The trial judge found the legislation violated section 15(1)
equality rights, and issued a suspended declaration under section 24(1),
that biological and adoptive parents were entitled to the same benefits.
The legislation was amended before the appeal was heard in the Supreme Court, to provide parental benefits for biological parents on the
same basis as adoptive parents, but for a reduced period of time. The
sole issue was the remedies available for breach of Charter rights, particularly whether courts could rectify a constitutional defect by reading
words into invalid legislation.
Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, enumerated the remedies that are available under section 52(1), and articulated a method for
determining which remedy to grant in a particular case; these aspects of
51

Supra, note 8.
The Court also set out guidelines for applying s. 52(1), which are addressed later in
this paper.
53
Supra, note 9.
54
Supra, note 10.
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2004 SCC 46, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, released June 30, 2004 [hereinafter “Demers’].
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the judgment are discussed below. He also held that a section 24(1)
remedy may be available when section 52 is not engaged because the
legislation is valid, but action taken under the law infringes a person’s
Charter rights.56 He added that a personal remedy under section 24(1)
“will rarely be available in conjunction with an action under s. 52 …
Ordinarily, where a provision is declared unconstitutional and immediately struck down pursuant to s. 52, that will be the end of the matter.
No retroactive s. 24 remedy will be available.”57 Further, if a declaration
of invalidity is temporarily suspended, a section 24 remedy generally
will not be granted because it would duplicate the relief flowing from
the suspended declaration.
This issue was touched upon in the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision
in Guimond. The plaintiff commenced a class action seeking a declaration that a law was invalid under section 52, and damages for breach of
the constitutional rights of persons who had been sentenced to imprisonment for regulatory offences under the legislation when they failed to
pay fines. Justice Gonthier, writing for the unanimous Court, relied on
the common law principle that the Crown is not liable for damages
arising from the enactment of laws which are later found to be unconstitutional.58 He added that “[a]lthough it cannot be said that damages can
never be obtained following a declaration of constitutional invalidity, it
is true, as a general rule, that an action for damages under s. 24(1) of the
Charter cannot be coupled with a declaratory action for invalidity under
s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”59 The claim for damages in this
case was based on a bare allegation of constitutional invalidity, which
did not warrant a departure from the general rule.
The relationship between section 24(1) and section 52(1) was addressed at greater length in the Supreme Court’s decision in Mackin60
released in 2002. Justice Gonthier, writing for the majority, declared

56

Supra, note 8, at 719. See also Eldridge, supra, note 42, at 643-44, para. 20.
Schachter, id., at 720.
58
Supra, note 9, at para. 15. The classic statements of the common law principle are
set out in Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Winnipeg (City), [1971] S.C.R. 957 [hereinafter “Welbridge”] and Central Canada Potash Co. v. Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42 [hereinafter
“Central Canada Potash”]. Justice Gonthier found in Guimond that the “claim of right”
defence to tort claims applied equally to claims made under s. 24(1) of the Charter.
59
Guimond, id., at para. 19.
60
Supra, note 10.
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legislation invalid on the basis that it infringed judicial independence by
eliminating the office of supernumerary judges in the Provincial Courts
of New Brunswick, and replacing them with a panel of retired judges.
He rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for damages under section 24(1) of the
Charter, based on the general public law rule that “absent conduct that is
clearly wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power, the courts will not
award damages for the harm suffered as a result of the mere enactment
or application of a law that is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional.”61 Put another way, “[i]nvalidity of governmental action, without
more, clearly should not be a basis for liability for harm caused by the
action.”62
Justice Gonthier relied on Guimond for the proposition that since
the Charter was enacted, a plaintiff could theoretically seek compensatory and punitive damages under section 24(1) of the Charter.63 However, the common law doctrine of limited immunity created a balance
between constitutional rights and effective government. He concluded
that laws must be given their full force and effect until they are declared
invalid, and damages may be awarded only if government conduct under such laws is clearly wrong, in bad faith, or an abuse of power.64
While he could not completely rule out the possibility of damages being
awarded following a declaration of invalidity, he held that as a general
matter “an action for damages brought under s. 24(1) of the Charter
cannot be combined with an action for a declaration of invalidity based
on s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”65
There was no evidence to suggest that when the government
eliminated the office of supernumerary judge, it “acted negligently,
in bad faith or by abusing its powers,”66 or that it “displayed negligence, bad faith or wilful blindness with respect to its constitutional
61

Id., at para. 78, citing Welbridge and Central Canada Potash, both supra, note 58.
Mackin, id., citing Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, vol. 3 (1958) at 487. Justice
Gonthier also relied on an administrative law text by Dussault & Borgeat, Administrative
Law: A Treatise, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) Vol. 5, at 177, which states that a legislature “cannot be held liable for anything it does in exercising its legislative powers. The law is
the source of duty [and] it is hard to imagine that [a legislature] can as the lawmaker be held
accountable for harm caused to an individual following the enactment of legislation.”
63
Mackin, id., at para. 79.
64
Id., citing Crown Trust Co. v. Ontario (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 41 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
65
Mackin, id., at para. 81.
66
Id., at para. 82.
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obligations…”67 The legislation came into force more than two years
before the Supreme Court’s decision in the Provincial Court Judges
Reference68 substantially changed the law on institutional independence
of the judiciary. The failure of the Minister of Justice to refer the Bill69
to a legislative Committee, as he had promised, had “no probative value
as to whether … the legislation was enacted wrongly, for ulterior motives or with knowledge of its unconstitutionality.”70 Consequently, the
claimants were not entitled to damages under section 24(1) in addition
to a declaration of invalidity under section 52(1).
The Supreme Court commented on this line of authorities in its June
2004 decision in Demers.71 The Court held that the regime established
in Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code72 for dealing with accused persons
found unfit to stand trial violated the section 7 Charter rights of persons
who were permanently unfit, since they would continue to be subject to
the criminal process until they either became fit for trial or the Crown
failed to establish a prima facie case against them. The law was overly
broad since it restricted the liberty of accused persons even if there was
no evidence that their capacity would be recovered or that they posed a
significant threat to public safety.73
The Court held that the appropriate remedy was a declaration of invalidity under section 52(1), suspended for 12 months.74 They found
that under Schachter, no retroactive remedy is available under section
24 when legislation is declared unconstitutional and immediately struck.
Further, when a section 52 declaration of invalidity is temporarily suspended, a section 24 remedy is not available since it would give the
declaration retroactive effect. If the remedy is reading down or reading

67

Id.
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Reference”].
69
Bill 7, Act to Amend the Provincial Court Act, S.N.B. 1995, c. 6.
70
Supra, note 10, at para. 83.
71
Supra, note 55. Justices Iacobucci and Bastarache wrote on behalf of eight judges.
Justice LeBel wrote separate reasons concurring with the majority’s decision on s. 7 of the
Charter, but reaching a different result on the division of powers issue.
72
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The provisions that were challenged were ss. 672.33, 672.54
and 672.81(1) of the Code.
73
Demers, supra, note 55, at paras. 41-43, 52, 55.
74
Id., at para. 56.
68
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in, a section 24 remedy would duplicate the section 52 relief.75 The
Court found that Schachter “precludes courts from granting a s. 24(1)
individual remedy during the period of suspended invalidity.”76
It observed that while this rule has generally been applied in cases
involving pecuniary liability, the underlying rationale is that so long as
the government acts in good faith and without abusing its power, it will
not be held liable when a law is subsequently found to be unconstitutional. However, the Court added that “[a]lthough the rule in Schachter
… precludes courts from combining retroactive remedies under s. 24(1)
with s. 52 remedies, it does not stop courts from awarding prospective
remedies under s. 24(1) in conjunction with s. 52 remedies.”77 Therefore, if the challenged provisions were not amended within 12 months,
permanently unfit accused persons who did not pose a significant threat
to public safety could apply for a stay of proceedings under section
24(1) to quash the criminal charges and release them from indefinite
criminal proceedings.
To summarize, under Schachter, Guimond and Mackin, a section
24(1) remedy will rarely be available in conjunction with a remedy
under section 52(1). The underlying rationale is the common law principle that governments that act in good faith will not be held liable under a
statute that is later found to be unconstitutional. A section 24(1) remedy
will only be available in conjunction with a ruling that a law is invalid
under section 52(1) if the legislature’s conduct when it passed the law
amounted to negligence, bad faith or an abuse of power, was clearly
wrong, or displayed an unreasonable attitude or an ulterior motive. Failure to anticipate changes in the legal understanding of a constitutional
right will not suffice, nor will failure to fulfil a promise to refer a proposed law to Committee.78 However, according to Demers, this line of
authorities does not prevent a court from granting a prospective remedy
under section 24(1) in conjunction with a section 52 remedy, provided
that the section 24 remedy takes effect after any suspension of the section 52 declaration has expired.
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Id., at para. 61.
Id., at para. 62.
Id., at para. 63.
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See McAllister, “Mackin: Of Sterile Rules and Real People” (2003), 21 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. (2d) 339, for a more complete discussion of these principles.
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V. GUIDELINES FOR GRANTING REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 52(1)
1. Schachter
Having covered the basic principles for interpreting section 24(1)
and section 52(1) and the relationship between these provisions, I now
turn to the guidelines that have been established by the Supreme Court
for granting remedies, beginning with section 52(1). As noted above,
these principles were initially set out in Schachter,79 and they were further developed in Vriend.80 In Schachter, Lamer C.J. held that the remedies available under section 52(1) include striking down, with or
without a temporary suspension of the declaration of invalidity, reading
down or reading in.81 The two guiding principles for determining the
appropriate remedy are respect for the role of the legislators and respect
for the purposes of the Charter.82
Chief Justice Lamer also established a method for choosing a section 52 remedy. The first step is to define the extent of the inconsistency. If there is a broadly defined inconsistency, the court may have to
strike down the entire statute, whereas a narrowly defined inconsistency
may be remedied by striking down, severing, or reading in. The second
step is for the court to choose between severance and reading in, taking
into account the following factors: remedial precision; the need to avoid
interfering with the legislative objective; whether the changes in the law
would be so substantial that it would not be safe to assume the legislature would have passed it; and the significance or longstanding nature of
the remaining portion. The third step in choosing a remedy is to decide
whether to temporarily suspend the declaration of invalidity to give the
legislature an opportunity to address the problem. This is appropriate
where striking down creates a danger to the public or threatens the rule
of law, and where striking down an underinclusive law would mean that
no one would receive benefits.
When this method was applied in Schachter, Lamer C.J. concluded
that the underinclusive maternity and parental benefits regime violated

79
80
81
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Supra, note 8.
Supra, note 12.
Supra, note 8, at 695.
Id., at 700. See also R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, at para. 114.
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the claimant’s section 15 right to equal benefit of the law. Striking down
the regime would deprive everyone of benefits. The legislative objective
of parental benefits could not be ascertained from the text, nor had it
been clarified through section 1 evidence. Both factors weighed against
reading in parental benefits for biological fathers. In addition, reading in
a much larger group than those already covered would have substantially intruded upon the legislature’s function. Therefore, the majority
concluded that the appropriate remedy was to declare the legislation
invalid, and temporarily suspend the declaration.
2. Vriend
The central conclusion in Schachter was that reading in constituted
a legitimate remedy under section 52. In Vriend83 the law on reading in
was more finely tuned. Although Schachter established that one of the
twin guiding principles for determining the remedy was respect for the
role of the legislators, the majority in Vriend held that reading in may be
appropriate even if the legislature has made a deliberate choice to the
contrary. The difficulty was that Alberta persistently refused to add
sexual orientation to the prohibited grounds of discrimination in its
human rights legislation, which meant that the claimants were challenging an intentional legislative omission. One of the judges in the Alberta
Court of Appeal84 held that reading in was never appropriate where a
legislative omission was a deliberate choice, and that the appropriate
remedy if the law was invalid was to leave it to the government to remedy the constitutional defect.
The majority in the Supreme Court did not agree. Justice Iacobucci,
writing for the majority with respect to the appropriate remedy,85 read
sexual orientation into the Act effective immediately. This remedy
would enhance the purpose of the Act as a whole, which was to recognize and protect the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of individuals
by eliminating discriminatory practices.86 Further, there was no risk of
83

Supra, note 12.
(1996), 181 A.R. 16, 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595 (C.A.).
85
Justices Cory and Iacobucci released joint reasons for the majority, in which Cory J.
dealt with standing, the application of the Charter, and the breach of s. 15(1), while Iacobucci
J. dealt with s. 1, the appropriate remedy, and the disposition.
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Supra, note 12, at 569, para. 150.
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harmful unintended consequences to private parties or public funds, and
the mechanisms for dealing with discrimination were already in place
and did not require significant adjustment.
Justice Iacobucci acknowledged that whenever a statute is found
unconstitutional, there will be some interference with legislative intent,
whether the court reads provisions into the law or strikes it down.87 The
closest a court can come to respecting legislative intent is to determine
what the legislature would likely have done if it had known that its
measures were unconstitutional. The legislature’s choice of means will
be treated as a bar to reading in only where the means are so central to
the legislative objective, and so integral to the statutory scheme, that the
legislature would not have enacted the law without them.88 The exclusion of sexual orientation was not so central to the aims of the legislature, or so integral to the statutory scheme, that it would rather have
sacrificed the Act than include sexual orientation.
Indeed, the Alberta government responded to a recommendation to
add sexual orientation to the Act by stating that this issue would be dealt
with by the courts, which Iacobucci J. took as an invitation for the
courts to read sexual orientation into the Act if its exclusion violated the
Charter. He also noted that “a democracy requires that legislators take
into account the interests of majorities and minorities alike… Where the
interests of a minority have been denied consideration, especially where
that group has historically been the target of prejudice and discrimination … judicial intervention is warranted to correct a democratic process
that has acted improperly.”89 Further, even when a court reads provisions into an unconstitutional law, the legislature has options. It can pass
a new law which it believes will withstand Charter challenge, or it may
engage “the ultimate ‘parliamentary safeguard’ ”90 by exercising the
legislative override in section 33 of the Charter.
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Id., at 574, para. 166.
Id., at 574-75, para. 167.
Id., at 577, para. 176. Note that, as discussed above, the majority in Vriend specifically adopted the Hogg and Bushell dialogue theory of Charter development.
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3. Summary
In summary, Schachter established that the remedies available under
section 52(1) include striking down — with or without a temporary
suspension — reading down or reading in. The guiding principles are
respect for the role of the legislature and for the purposes of the Charter.
The three steps in identifying the section 52 remedy are: (1) define the
extent of the inconsistency; (2) choose between severance and reading
in, taking into account remedial precision, non-interference with the
legislative objective, how substantially the legislation would change,
and the significance of the remaining portion; and (3) decide whether to
temporarily suspend the declaration of invalidity, depending on whether
striking down would create a public danger, threaten the rule of law, or
deprive everyone of underinclusive benefits. Vriend added that a court
may correct an unconstitutional legislative omission by reading in an
excluded group, even if the legislature explicitly refused to do so.

VI. JURISDICTION TO GRANT REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 52(1)
1. Statutory Criminal Courts
The issue of jurisdiction to grant remedies under section 52(1) has
most often arisen when the decision maker was a provincial criminal
court or an administrative tribunal, since they have no inherent jurisdiction and their authority depends entirely upon statute. The starting point
is Big M and Mills, both of which involved provincial criminal courts. In
Big M,91 a company was charged with selling goods in violation of Sunday closing legislation. The Supreme Court held that while a Provincial
Court judge presiding at trial could not grant a declaration of invalidity
under section 24(1), it could rely on the principle of constitutional supremacy in section 52(1) to dismiss charges since no one can be convicted under an invalid law. Indeed, provincial courts already had
authority to determine whether the law under which a charge was laid
was ultra vires.92 Justice Dickson added that “[i]f a court or tribunal
finds any statute to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the overriding
91
92

Supra, note 6.
Id., at 313-14. This principle is set out in R. v. Westendorp, supra, note 49.
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effect of … s. 52(1), is to give the Court not only the power, but the
duty, to regard the inconsistent statute, to the extent of the inconsistency, as being no longer ‘of force or effect’.”93
In Mills,94 the question was whether a Provincial Court judge presiding at a preliminary inquiry could order a stay of proceedings to
remedy a breach of the accused’s section 11(b) Charter right to be tried
within a reasonable time. The Charter breach resulted from the actions
of government officials, and section 52 did not apply since there was no
challenge to legislation. All members of the Court agreed that a preliminary inquiry is not a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning
of section 24(1), since that judge’s sole function is to decide whether
there is enough evidence to commit the accused for trial.95 The judge
has no authority to acquit, convict, impose a penalty, grant a remedy, or
determine whether an accused’s Charter rights have been infringed.96
Therefore, the issue of delay had to be heard by the trial judge.97
2. Introduction to Administrative Tribunals
The more difficult issue is the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals
to determine Charter challenges. Both courts and administrative tribunals
are bound by the Constitution, and must conduct their proceedings in
93
Big M, id. at 353; see also R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, at
307, per La Forest J. to the effect that someone who believes a law is unconstitutional need
not bring an action to challenge the law, but can simply wait to be charged under the statute
and raise the Charter violation in defence.
94
Supra, note 7.
95
Id., per Lamer J., at 889 and La Forest J., at 970.
96
Id., per McIntyre J., at 954. This decision was affirmed in R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 588, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23 [hereinafter “Rahey”], and R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R.
1120, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119 [hereinafter “Smith”], both of which involved complaints of
delay. See also R. v. Seaboyer (sub nom. R. v. Gayme), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, [1991] S.C.J.
No. 62 [hereinafter “Seaboyer”], in which the majority held that preliminary inquiry judges
do not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of legislation.
97
This aspect of the decision is explored below under jurisdiction to grant s. 24(1)
remedies. Despite this apparently limited constitutional authority, the Court emphasized in its
1997 decision in the Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 68, at 85-87, paras. 127-29,
that provincial criminal courts play a critical role in enforcing the provisions and protecting
the values of the Constitution. They enforce s. 52, exercise remedial powers under s. 24,
police the division of powers, and make decisions on the rights of aboriginal peoples under
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This increased role flows in part from a legislative
policy of granting greater jurisdiction to provincial courts.
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accordance with the requirements of the Charter. However, the Supreme
Court held in one of its earliest Charter decisions — Dolphin Delivery
(1986)98 — that a court order is not a form of government action which
is subject to Charter scrutiny. The Court held three years later in Slaight
Communications Inc. v. Davidson (1989)99 that an administrative tribunal’s orders are not subject to the same treatment as court orders. The
majority100 held that the Charter applied to the order of an adjudicator
because he was appointed under federal legislation, and all of his powers were derived from statute. Legislation that confers an imprecise
discretion must not be interpreted so as to allow Charter rights to be
infringed. Consequently, administrative bodies that have statutory authority to exercise such discretion exceed their jurisdiction if they make
orders that infringe Charter rights.101
The more complex question was whether administrative tribunals
could determine Charter challenges to their enabling legislation. The
answer required a careful balancing of the practical advantages and
disadvantages of decision makers other than courts determining Charter
issues. Before the Charter was enacted, tribunals had authority to construe their enabling legislation, and to determine other questions of law
that were necessary to dispose of all matters in issue in cases properly
before them.102 This included authority to decide whether a matter was
within federal or provincial legislative competence, and therefore within
the tribunal’s constitutional mandate.103 Charter challenges to enabling
legislation could be considered a natural extension of this function.
98
See Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U., Local 580, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, [1986]
S.C.J. No. 75.
99
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45 [hereinafter “Slaight”].
100
Justice Lamer wrote for the majority with respect to the positive order requiring the
employer to write a letter of recommendation containing specific facts. He held this order
infringed the employer’s rights under s. 2(b), but was justified under s. 1. Chief Justice
Dickson wrote the majority reasons on the negative order prohibiting the employer from
responding to inquiries other than with the letter, which he found also infringed s. 2(b) but
was saved by s. 1.
101
Supra, note 99, at 1077-78. Although the adjudicator’s order in Slaight limited the
employer’s freedom of expression, the limitation constituted a reasonable limit under s. 1. See
Slaight, id., at 1080-81.
102
See, for example, Taylor & Son Ltd. v. Barnett, [1953] 1 All E.R. 843 (C.A.), and
McLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517.
103
See, for example, Windsor Airline Limousine Service Ltd. v. Ontario Taxi Assn., Local 1688, (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 732 (Div. Ct.).
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Some bodies, like labour tribunals, had considerable expertise with
adjudicative functions, and were well-placed to compile the factual
record and analyze competing policy concerns. Further, people who
were required to appear before tribunals would have their constitutional
rights respected without the expense and delay of separate court proceedings, and administrative decision makers would be forced to consider Charter values.
The disadvantages of having administrative tribunals decide in constitutional questions included the fact that these bodies had features of
both the executive and judicial branches of government,104 as well as
varying levels of legal expertise and functions that ranged from purely
administrative to quasi-judicial in nature. There were procedural problems that could have resulted in inadequate evidence, and there were no
formal mechanisms for involving the Attorneys General. Most importantly, administrative tribunals were conceived as specialist bodies to
relieve over-burdened courts and provide accessible, inexpensive, and
swift justice.105 Requiring them to decide Charter challenges could potentially “go against the raison d’être of administrative tribunals —
specialization, simple rules of evidence and procedure, speedy decisions.”106
3. The 1990-1991 Trilogy
Ultimately, the question was whether justice would be better served
if tribunals made the initial determination of constitutional challenges.107

104
Indeed, the American approach was to entirely exclude administrative bodies from
this type of decision-making. However, our system of government is not based on a rigid
separation of powers like the United States Constitution, and nothing in the Canadian Constitution apart from ss. 96 to 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 precludes legislators from conferring judicial decision-making authority on bodies other than courts. See Douglas/Kwantlen
Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, at 599-605
[S.C.R.] [hereinafter “Douglas College”], and Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, [1991] S.C.J. No. 42, at 15 [S.C.R.] [hereinafter “Cuddy
Chicks”].
105
See McAllister, “Administrative Tribunals and the Charter: A Tale of Form Conquering Substance” [1992] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 131, at 131-32, for a more complete
discussion of these issues.
106
Douglas College, supra, note 104, at 602.
107
Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 104, at 18.
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This question was explored in a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1990 with Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College,108 followed six months later in the 1991 companion cases of Cuddy
Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)109 and TétreaultGadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission).110 In
both Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks, the legislation explicitly conferred jurisdiction on the tribunals to decide questions of law, whereas
in Tétreault-Gadoury there was no such explicit authority. Justice La
Forest wrote the majority reasons in these cases.
In Douglas College the question was whether an arbitrator could
decide if a mandatory retirement clause in a collective agreement violated section 15 of the Charter. The arbitrator had authority to interpret
and apply the provisions of the collective agreement, and the labour
legislation gave him power to interpret and apply laws intended to regulate the employment relationship. Justice La Forest held that a tribunal
performing its statutory function is “entitled not only to construe the
relevant legislation but to determine whether that legislation was validly
enacted.”111 He reasoned that a tribunal must respect the principle of
constitutional supremacy set out in section 52(1); if it finds that a law it
is supposed to apply is invalid, “it is bound to treat it as having no force
or effect.”112 However, if the claimant seeks a remedy under section
24(1), the Mills rule applies, and the tribunal must have statutory authority over the subject matter and the parties, as well as authority to grant
the remedy sought.113 Justice La Forest concluded that the arbitrator had
jurisdiction over the parties, authority to deal with the Charter challenge
since the statute conferred power to interpret and apply laws intended to
regulate employment relationships which included the Charter,114 and
power to grant a remedy like reinstatement if the mandatory retirement
clause was unconstitutional.115
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[1991] 2 S.C.R. 22, [1991] S.C.J. No. 41 [hereinafter “Tétreault-Gadoury”].
Douglas College, supra, note 104, at 594.
Id.
Id., at 594-95.
Id., at 596.
Id., at 598.

Supreme Court Law Review

26

(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Six months later in Cuddy Chicks a union applied to the Labour Relations Board for certification of agricultural workers. Since this group
was excluded from the legislative regime, the union also challenged the
exclusion as a Charter violation. The majority held that a tribunal must
have jurisdiction that is expressly or impliedly conferred by statute over
the parties, the subject matter, and the remedy sought in order to entertain constitutional challenges. The subject matter was a Charter challenge to a provision of the Board’s enabling legislation, and the remedy
of certification could be granted only if the statutory exclusion was held
to be unconstitutional. Authority to apply the Charter had to be found in
the Board’s enabling legislation.
Justice La Forest adopted the proposition in Douglas College that
“… an administrative tribunal which has been conferred the power to
interpret law holds a concomitant power to determine whether that law
is constitutionally valid.”116 He added that “the relevant inquiry is …
whether the legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the power to
interpret and apply the Charter.”117 Since the Board had express statutory jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact or law in any matter
before it, and any legal questions relating to its jurisdiction, it also had
authority to determine the constitutional validity of the challenged provision, and to grant a remedy which required it to treat the provision as
having no force or effect.118 However, in both Douglas College and
Cuddy Chicks, La Forest J. cautioned that no curial deference will be
extended to decisions made by administrative tribunals regarding constitutional challenges. In Cuddy Chicks he added that a tribunal cannot
issue a formal declaration of invalidity; its ruling on a Charter issue is
not binding and only applies to the matter in which it is raised.119
The companion case decided at the same time as Cuddy Chicks was
Tétreault-Gadoury,120 which differed in that the legislation established
three administrative bodies, and did not explicitly confer authority to
decide questions of law on two of these tribunals. The Canada Employment and Immigration Commission denied the claimant’s application
for unemployment insurance benefits since the legislation disqualified
116
117
118
119
120
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persons over the age of 65.121 The claimant appealed to a Board of Referees, arguing that the statutory disqualification violated her section 15
equality rights. When the Board upheld the Commission’s decision and
declined to rule on the Charter issue, the claimant bypassed the second
level administrative appeal to an Umpire, and went directly to judicial
review in the Federal Court of Appeal.
As in the previous cases, section 24(1) was not engaged since the
claimant challenged the constitutional validity of the tribunal’s enabling
legislation and sought relief under section 52(1). Justice La Forest reiterated that jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues must be found in
the tribunal’s constituent statute. While its express mandate is normally
the most important factor, other factors must be considered if the legislature has not spoken on the Board’s authority to decide legal issues.122
There were two factors which indicated that Parliament intended the
Umpire, and not the Board, to have jurisdiction to decide Charter challenges. First, the Umpire had jurisdiction to decide any question of law
or fact necessary for the disposition of an appeal.123 Second, the Regulations124 contemplated an Umpire finding a provision of the Act unconstitutional. Failure to confer similar powers on the Board was unlikely to
have been a legislative oversight.125
Justice La Forest also examined the statutory scheme and compared
the three administrative bodies. The Commission, at one end of the
spectrum, was responsible for making all initial decisions on entitlement. Given the volume of claims, it could not have discharged its function if it also had to determine Charter issues. Umpires, at the opposite
end, were Federal Court judges with the specialized legal training and
experience necessary to adjudicate constitutional challenges. Umpires
had an adjudicative function, and were in a better position to hear and
resolve constitutional issues without creating delay in the administrative
system than the Commission, whose primary function was fact finding.126
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Boards of Referees fell somewhere in between. Even though they were
capable of dealing with Charter issues, this could not outweigh Parliament’s intent to confer this authority on the Umpire. The practical advantages of having a tribunal make an initial ruling on Charter issues
were preserved because the Umpire was a relatively accessible administrative body outside the court system.127
4. The Cooper Decision (1996)
The Tétreault-Gadoury approach was refined in Cooper v. Canada
(Human Rights Commission).128 The question was whether the Canadian
Human Rights Commission, or a tribunal appointed by the Commission
to investigate a complaint, had authority to determine constitutional
challenges to its constituent legislation — the Canadian Human Rights
Act (the CHRA).129 The Commission had authority to administer the
CHRA, and to deal with complaints of discriminatory practices. When it
received a complaint, the Commission would appoint an investigator to
look into the matter and report findings. It could then appoint a tribunal
to inquire into the complaint and grant a remedy.130 Decisions of the
Commission and the tribunal were subject to judicial review.
The complainants in Cooper were airline pilots who challenged the
mandatory retirement clause in their collective agreement on the basis of
age discrimination. However, the CHRA provided that termination of
employment at the normal retirement age for similar positions did not
constitute a discriminatory practice. The investigator recommended
dismissal of the complaints, and the Commission decided that an inquiry
was not warranted.131 Since the CHRA did not expressly confer a general power to decide questions of law on either the Commission or a
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tribunal appointed by the Commission, the question became whether
Parliament implicitly granted this jurisdiction.132
Justice La Forest held that it was appropriate to take practical matters into account in making this determination. For example, the tribunal’s composition and structure, its expertise, and its procedure and
appeal routes provide an insight into the mandate which the legislature
conferred on the administrative tribunal. Further, “there may be pragmatic and functional policy concerns that argue for or against the tribunal having constitutional competence, though such concerns can never
supplant the intention of the legislature.”133 Justice La Forest concluded
that nothing in the scheme of the Act implied that either the Commission or the tribunal had the authority to entertain constitutional challenges to the CHRA.
The Commission was not an adjudicative body; it fulfilled a screening function analogous to that of a judge at a preliminary inquiry. It
received complaints, assessed the sufficiency of the evidence, and determined whether an inquiry by a tribunal was warranted, but not
whether the complaint was made out.134 The Commission’s explicit
authority to interpret and apply its enabling statute did not imply that it
had jurisdiction to decide constitutional challenges, since every administrative body has this power. Further, its authority to determine whether
it had jurisdiction over a complaint was conceptually different from
reviewing jurisdictional provisions for compliance with the Charter. As
La Forest J. put it, “[t]he former represents an application of Parliament’s intent as reflected in the Act while the latter involves ignoring
that intent.”135
He concluded that Parliament did not intend that the Commission
would have power to consider questions of law. Further, there were
limited practical advantages to having it address challenges to the
CHRA. The Commission was not an adjudicative body with special
expertise in questions of law or procedural mechanisms like rules of
evidence. Its function of dealing with human rights complaints would
132
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have been disrupted if it had to address complex constitutional issues.136
In any event, its decision on a Charter issue would probably be reviewed
in the Federal Court, and it would have been more efficient to commence court proceedings where the issue could be fully canvassed and
resolved.
A tribunal appointed by the Commission had authority to inquire
into a complaint and determine if it was substantiated, which was primarily a fact-finding inquiry. It was implicit in the scheme of the Act
that the tribunal had a general power to deal with questions of law, including interpretation of the CHRA and other statutes, division of powers questions, the validity of a ground of discrimination under the
CHRA, and possibly Charter arguments on the constitutional validity of
the remedies available in a particular case.137 However, as a practical
matter the tribunal did not have special legal expertise or formal evidentiary rules, its decisions were subject to judicial review, and the time
required to dispose of constitutional issues would defeat its primary
purpose of efficient and timely adjudication of human rights complaints.138 Justice La Forest concluded that “… while a tribunal may
have jurisdiction to consider general legal and constitutional questions,
logic demands that it has no ability to question the constitutional validity of a limiting provision of the Act.”139
5. The Rules Restated in Martin
The decision in Cooper appeared to substantially narrow the range
of tribunals that may have had implied jurisdiction to determine Charter
challenges to their enabling legislation under the 1990-1991 trilogy. The
practical considerations taken into account in Cooper, particularly
whether the tribunal had an adjudicative function or specialized legal
expertise, would have undermined the authority of most administrative
decision makers to hear Charter challenges. Further, the distinction
drawn between general legal questions and constitutional issues was
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inconsistent with the decisions in Douglas College, Cuddy Chicks, and
Tétreault-Gadoury.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court restated the law in Nova Scotia
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin,140 released in October 2003.
The claimants challenged provisions that excluded chronic pain syndrome from the provincial general workers’ compensation system, and
replaced it with a four-week work conditioning program after which no
benefits were available.141 The Workers’ Compensation Board (“the
Board”) made the initial decisions denying entitlement, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (“the Appeal Tribunal”) heard the
appeals. The claimants argued before the Appeal Tribunal that the legislation infringed their equality rights. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed that
it had jurisdiction to apply the Charter, and held that the challenged
provisions were unconstitutional.142
Justice Gonthier, writing for the unanimous Court, held that these
provisions violated section 15 of the Charter, and could not be saved
under section 1. He also reappraised and restated the rules concerning
the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to apply the Charter, holding
that “[a]dministrative tribunals which have jurisdiction — whether explicit or implied — to decide questions of law arising under a legislative
provision are presumed to have concomitant jurisdiction to decide the
constitutional validity of that provision. This presumption may only be
rebutted by showing that the legislature clearly intended to exclude
Charter issues from the tribunal’s authority over questions of law.”143
He also explicitly stated that the majority reasons in Cooper could no
longer be relied upon to the extent that they were inconsistent with the
approach in Martin.144
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The legislation at issue in Martin expressly conferred authority on
the Appeal Tribunal to decide questions of law, and this explicit jurisdiction was presumed to include authority to consider the constitutional
validity of its constituent legislation. The presumption was not rebutted;
there was no clear implication in the Act that the legislature intended to
exclude Charter issues from the Appeal Tribunal’s authority to decide
questions of law.145
Justice Gonthier restated the policy reasons set out in the 1990-1991
trilogy for permitting administrative tribunals to determine constitutional challenges to their enabling statutes. The most important is that
the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, and inconsistent laws are
invalid. The invalidity arises by operation of section 52(1), not from a
declaration of a court. In principle, a provision that is inconsistent with
the Constitution is invalid from the moment it is enacted. Thus, “by
virtue of s. 52(1), the question of constitutional validity inheres in every
legislative enactment. Courts may not apply invalid laws, and the same
obligation applies to every level and branch of government, including
the administrative organs of the state.”146
The second reason that tribunals should hear Charter challenges is
that they have expertise in their field, including a thorough understanding of the legislative scheme, the practical constraints and the consequences of a remedy, which makes their record and findings valuable to
a reviewing court.147 Third, allowing administrative tribunals to decide
Charter issues does not undermine the role of the courts as final arbiters
of constitutional validity since these decisions are subject to judicial
review on a correctness standard.148 Fourth, tribunals have limited authority to grant constitutional remedies; they cannot make general declarations of invalidity and their findings that provisions are invalid do not
bind future decision makers. A binding precedent that legislation is
invalid can only be obtained through a declaration from a court.149

Commission had no express or implied authority to decide questions of law arising under the
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Since tribunals are creatures of statute, their jurisdiction to entertain
Charter issues must be found in their enabling legislation, and it must
extend to the subject matter, the parties, and the remedy sought.150 The
central question is whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on the
constitutional validity of the challenged provision.151 To answer this
question the court applies the presumption, based on the principle of
constitutional supremacy, that all legal decisions must take into account
the supreme law of the land. Generally, an administrative tribunal that
has the power to interpret a law has concomitant power to determine
whether that law is constitutionally valid.152 The corollary is that people
are entitled to assert their constitutional rights in the most accessible
forum, without commencing parallel court proceedings.153 Many tribunals have exclusive initial jurisdiction over a matter, and forcing Charter
issues into the courts would divide the proceedings, and make them
longer and more expensive.154
The issue is not whether the legislature intended that the tribunal
apply the Charter, and suggestions to that effect in previous cases such
as Cooper must be ignored. The legislative intent approach is artificial
since many statutes were enacted before the Charter came into force,
and it is not compatible with the principle that the question of constitutional validity inheres in every law by virtue of section 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1867.155
The correct question is “whether the empowering legislation implicitly or explicitly grants to the tribunal the jurisdiction to interpret or
decide any question of law. If it does, then the tribunal will be presumed
to have the concomitant jurisdiction to interpret or decide that question
in light of the Charter, unless the legislator has removed that power
from the tribunal… In other words, the power to decide a question of
150
Id., at para. 33, citing Douglas College, supra, note 104, at 595; Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 104, at 14-15.
151
Martin, id., at para. 34, citing Douglas College, id., at 596; Cuddy Chicks, id., at 15.
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Martin, id., at para. 28. See also para. 34, citing Cuddy Chicks, id., at 13; and Cooper, supra, note 2, at para. 46.
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Martin, id., citing McLachlin C.J. in dissent in Cooper, supra, note 2, at para. 70;
and the majority in Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, [1995] S.C.J. No. 59, to the
effect that more people’s rights are determined by tribunals than courts, and all tribunals that
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law is the power to decide by applying only valid laws.”156 There need
not be a broad grant of jurisdiction to decide all questions of law that
arise before a tribunal. It is sufficient if the legislature confers power “to
decide questions of law arising under the challenged provision, and that
the constitutional question relate[s] to that provision.”157 As Gonthier J.
put it, the “Charter is not invoked as a separate subject matter; rather, it
is a controlling norm in decisions over matters within the tribunal’s
jurisdiction.”158
If there is no explicit grant, the court must decide “whether the legislator intended to confer upon the tribunal implied jurisdiction to decide
questions of law arising under the challenged provision.”159 The court
must look at the statute as a whole and consider relevant factors which
include: the tribunal’s statutory mandate, and whether the ability to
decide questions of law is necessary to fulfill this mandate; the interaction of the tribunal with other parts of the administrative system;
whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature; and practical considerations that include the tribunal’s capacity to consider questions of law.
However, practical considerations cannot override a clear implication in the statute, particularly where lack of authority to decide questions of law would undermine the tribunal’s capacity to fulfill its
mandate. If the tribunal has implied jurisdiction to decide questions of
law arising under a legislative provision, it also has jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of that provision.160 Further, there is
no distinction between “general” and “limited” questions of law; an
administrative tribunal either will or will not have power to decide legal
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issues.161 If a tribunal does have this power, it can go beyond the enabling statute and decide issues of common law or statutory interpretation
and Charter challenges that arise in cases properly before it.162 A tribunal need not be adjudicative in nature to find implicit jurisdiction.163
Once the presumption has been raised that a tribunal has jurisdiction
to decide Charter issues, the burden is on the party challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction to establish that the presumption has been rebutted.
The presumption “may only be rebutted by an explicit withdrawal of
authority to decide constitutional questions or by a clear implication to
the same effect, arising from the statute itself rather than from external
considerations. The question … is whether an examination of the statutory provisions clearly leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to exclude the Charter, or … a category of questions of law
encompassing the Charter, from the scope of the questions of law to be
addressed by the tribunal.”164
For example, if a statute expressly confers jurisdiction on another
administrative body to consider Charter issues or complex legal questions that are difficult or time-consuming, and it provides a procedure
that allows these issues to be efficiently directed to that body, this could
clearly imply that the legislature did not intend for the tribunal to decide
constitutional questions. Further, a tribunal’s practical capacity may be
relevant in determining the scope of its implicit authority to decide legal
questions, but these concerns alone generally will not be enough to rebut
the presumption.165 Justice Gonthier declined to express an opinion on
the constitutional validity of a provision that creates procedural barriers
161
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for claimants asserting their rights in a timely and effective manner; for
example, by removing Charter jurisdiction of a tribunal without providing an effective alternative forum.166
When he applied this test in Martin, Gonthier J. concluded that the
Appeal Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide Charter issues since it had
explicit statutory authority to determine questions of law. The Act provided that the Appeal Tribunal could “confirm, vary or reverse the decision of a hearing officer,”167 exercising the authority conferred on the
Board to “determine all questions of fact and law.” Other provisions
confirmed that the legislature intended to give the Tribunal authority to
decide legal issues. These included a right of appeal to the Court of
Appeal “on any question of law,”168 which suggested that the Appeal
Tribunal could make an initial determination on these questions. The
presumption of authority was not rebutted since there was no clear implication in the Act that the legislature intended to exclude the Charter
from the Appeal Tribunal’s authority.
Even if there had been no express grant of authority, Gonthier J.
found the Appeal Tribunal had implied power to decide questions of
law. First, this authority was necessary for the Tribunal to effectively
fulfill its mandate. Inability to decide such questions would have seriously impeded its work and threatened access to a forum that could
decide all aspects of an injured worker’s case. This implied jurisdiction
extended to other questions of statutory interpretation and common
law.169
Second, the Appeal Tribunal was adjudicative in nature and fully
capable of deciding Charter issues. It was under the supervision of the
Minister of Justice, and independent of the Board, which was supervised
by the Minister of Labour. The Appeal Tribunal established its own
rules of procedure, and could consider all relevant evidence and extend
time limits. Its members had the powers, privileges, and immunities of a
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commissioner appointed under the Public Inquiries Act,170 and all appeal
commissioners were lawyers.171 However, Gonthier J. emphasized that a
legislature can express its intention in a statutory scheme to give a nonadjudicative body authority to decide questions of law;172 “the adjudicative or non-adjudicative character of a tribunal is not dispositive.”173
Third, the Attorney General could intervene in any proceedings raising constitutional questions,174 which relieved private parties and administrative agencies of the burden of defending legislation.175 Fourth, the
backlog of cases at the Appeal Tribunal was a practical consideration
that had little weight in the face of the clear legislative intent to confer
power to decide questions of law. There was no suggestion that multiple
Charter challenges caused or contributed to the backlog. Further, permitting the Appeal Tribunal to apply the Charter gave courts the benefit
of a full record established by a specialized tribunal, and permitted
workers to have their Charter rights recognized relatively quickly in an
accessible and inexpensive forum.176
The Court concluded that the presumption that the Appeals Tribunal
had jurisdiction to apply the Charter was not rebutted by anything in the
Act. Provisions that permitted the Board of Directors to review appeals
raising issues of law and general policy did not undermine the tribunal’s
authority to decide Charter challenges. The Directors’ power to suspend
an appeal for one year to permit them to adopt a policy response to
issues was not sufficient to clearly rebut the presumption.177
The provision of the Act that conferred explicit jurisdiction on the
Appeal Tribunal to decide questions of law178 also applied to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which suggested that it had the same jurisdiction without respect to Charter challenges. The Board submitted that it
did not have the resources or expertise to deal with numerous Charter
cases, and that this would compromise its efficiency and timeliness in
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handling a large volume of compensation cases. However, these practical considerations could not override the clear expression of legislative
intent in the statute. The Act also permitted the Board to refer complex
issues to the Appeal Tribunal or to the courts as a matter of administrative convenience. Justice Gonthier held that since this approach preserved an administrative process which avoided parallel proceedings in
the courts, the Board would not infringe its duty to consider the constitutional validity of the Act by referring cases to the Appeal Tribunal.179
6. Martin Applied in the Paul Decision
The test in Martin was applied in the companion case of Paul v.
British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission).180 The issue was
whether the provincial Forest Appeals Commission (“the Commission”)
had jurisdiction to determine aboriginal rights issues that were raised in
defence to charges of cutting Crown timber in violation of the British
Columbia Forest Practices Code (“the Code”).181 Mr. Paul was a registered Indian who argued that he had an aboriginal right to cut timber to
use for renovating his home. The District Manager and the Administrative Review Panel found against him. He then appealed to the Commission, which held that it had jurisdiction to decide the aboriginal rights
issue. Paul challenged this decision, partly on the basis that a provincial
tribunal would be encroaching upon a matter within exclusive federal
competence.
Justice Bastarache, for the unanimous Court, held that British Columbia had legislative authority to confer jurisdiction on an administrative tribunal to consider questions of aboriginal rights in carrying out its
provincial mandate. The Code was a valid provincial law in relation to
the development, conservation and management of forestry resources. It
applied to Indians so long as it only had incidental effects upon the
“core of Indianness” (which is a matter within federal jurisdiction), and
179
Martin, supra, note 2, at paras. 62-65. There was no need for a conclusion that either
the Board or the Appeal Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to apply the Charter. Further, there was
no need to decide whether the Appeal Tribunal was a court of competent jurisdiction for the
purposes of s. 24(1) of the Charter, since the remedy sought was pursuant to s. 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1867.
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it did not contravene section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.182 The
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity did not apply since the Commission’s function was adjudicative and there was no provincial legislation that indirectly regulated federal matters.183
The Court rejected arguments that remedial powers are the key to
determining jurisdiction,184 since Tétreault-Gadoury185 recognized “that
the power to find a statutory provision of no effect, by virtue of s. 52(1)
… is distinct from the remedial power to invoke s. 24(1) of the Charter.
… In other words, an inferior court’s remedial powers are not determinative of its jurisdiction to hear and determine constitutional issues.”186
In any event, section 24(1) was not engaged in this case, since section
35 is not part of the Charter, and decisions dealing with section 24(1)
courts do not apply outside that unique context.187
The Court concluded that administrative tribunals must take into account all applicable federal and provincial legal rules in applying their
constituent legislation; otherwise, they would have grave difficulty
fulfilling their responsibilities.188 A board could not respect the constitutional division of powers if it was unable to take the boundary between
provincial and federal authority into account.189 Further, both federal
and provincial governments must respect section 35 aboriginal rights
unless an infringement of the right can be justified. Therefore, the provinces must be able to confer authority on their administrative tribunals
to take aboriginal rights into account.190
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The effect of this ruling was that Indians charged under the Code
would initially raise their aboriginal rights defences before the Commission instead of the superior court.191 The Commission would apply constitutional or federal laws in the same way as a provincial court when it
incidentally determines a question of aboriginal rights.192 This outcome
was consistent with the principle that individuals should be able to enforce their constitutionally protected rights as early as possible in the
administrative process.193
Justice Bastarache also held that the procedural right to raise a defence of aboriginal rights at first instance does not go to the core of
Indianness, and therefore does not intrude upon federal jurisdiction.194
The Commission’s decisions differ from both extinguishment of a right
and legislation relating to Indians or aboriginal rights.195 First, adjudicators do not create, amend, or extinguish aboriginal rights; they make
findings on the basis of the evidence about the existence or extinguishment of the right.196 Second, the Commission cannot make a declaration
as to the validity of a law. Its constitutional decisions are not legally
binding, they do not become authoritative common law over time, and
they are subject to review on a correctness standard.197
The Court found there was no basis upon which to distinguish the
power to determine section 35 questions from the power to decide any
other constitutional question. Aboriginal rights are not reserved to superior courts, they do not constitute a federal enclave, nor are they more
complex or difficult than other issues. Tribunals have fact finding processes, and their less stringent evidentiary rules may be more conducive
to fully airing an aboriginal rights issue.198 Further, Bastarache J. was
not convinced that there was either a rationale or a process that would
191
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appropriately distinguish between simple aboriginal law questions that
could be resolved by administrative tribunals, and more complex issues
that should be decided by courts.199
The Court adopted the approach set out in Martin as the correct
method for determining whether an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions.200 In particular, “the principle of
constitutional supremacy … leads to a presumption that all legal decisions will take into account the supreme law of the land [and that] the
power to decide a question of law is the power to decide by applying
only valid laws.”201 Justice Bastarache summarized the test as follows:
The essential question is whether the empowering legislation
implicitly or explicitly grants to the tribunal the jurisdiction to
interpret or decide any question of law. If it does, the tribunal will be
presumed to have the concomitant jurisdiction to interpret or decide
that question in light of s. 35 or any other relevant constitutional
provision. Practical considerations will generally not suffice to rebut
the presumption that arises from authority to decide questions of law.
This is not to say, however, that practical considerations cannot be
taken into consideration in determining … the most appropriate way of
handling a particular dispute where more than one option is
available.202

The Code permitted a party to “make submissions as to facts, law
and jurisdiction,” and to appeal on a question of law. Under the test in
Martin, this meant that the Commission had the power to decide questions of law, including aboriginal rights that arose incidentally to forestry matters, and nothing in the Code clearly rebutted this
presumption.203 Therefore, the Commission had jurisdiction to hear and
decide Paul’s defence of his aboriginal right to harvest logs.204 Alternatively, Paul could apply to the Superior Court for a declaration of his
aboriginal rights.
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7. Summary
Most questions with respect to jurisdiction under section 52(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982 have arisen in the context of statutory criminal courts and administrative tribunals, since their authority is drawn
entirely from statute. The starting point is Big M, in which the Supreme
Court held that even though a Provincial Court judge presiding at trial
cannot declare a law invalid, it can dismiss charges if it finds that the
law under which a charge was laid is unconstitutional.
Like courts, administrative tribunals are bound by the Constitution,
and must conduct their proceedings in accordance with the requirements
of the Charter. Unlike courts, their orders are subject to Charter scrutiny; administrative bodies exercising imprecise statutory discretion
exceed their jurisdiction if they make orders that infringe Charter rights.
Further, an administrative tribunal may have authority to entertain Charter challenges to its enabling legislation. The Supreme Court initially
addressed this question in the 1990-1991 trilogy of Douglas College,
Cuddy Chicks, and Tétreault-Gadoury, in which an arbitrator, a labour
board, and an Unemployment Insurance Act Umpire were found to have
jurisdiction to determine Charter challenges.
These cases established the foundation for the current guidelines,
particularly the principle that a tribunal need not be a court of competent
jurisdiction within the meaning of section 24(1) to have authority to
decide Charter challenges. A tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter, and authority to grant the remedy sought, has
authority under section 52(1) to determine Charter challenges to its
constituent legislation. In order to have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a Charter challenge, the tribunal must have express or implied
authority to determine questions of law. However, the tribunal cannot
grant a declaration of invalidity, and no curial deference will be extended to its constitutional decisions.
The issue was reconsidered in 1996 in Cooper, where the majority
held that neither the Canadian Human Rights Commission nor a Tribunal appointed by the Commission had authority to decide Charter challenges. The majority held that the central question was whether the
legislature intended that the tribunal could apply the Charter, which was
ascertained by focusing on practical considerations like the adjudicative
nature of the tribunal, and by distinguishing between types of legal
questions. Cooper appeared to be at odds with the 1990-1991 trilogy,
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which turned on authority to decide legal issues. Further, the practical
considerations that were taken into account would have excluded most
administrative decision makers.
The guidelines crystallized in the Martin decision in 2003, where
both the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the Appeal Tribunal
were found to have explicit jurisdiction to decide Charter issues. Martin
overruled Cooper to the extent of the inconsistency between the two
judgments. Administrative tribunals with either explicit or implied jurisdiction to interpret or decide any question of law under a legislative
provision, are now presumed to have the concomitant jurisdiction to
decide the constitutional validity of that provision. The suggestions in
Cooper that the issue is whether the legislature intended the tribunal to
apply the Charter must be ignored.
If there is no explicit grant of authority to decide legal questions, the
court must decide whether the legislature intended to confer implied
jurisdiction by looking to the statute as a whole. Relevant factors include the tribunal’s statutory mandate, and whether authority to decide
questions of law is necessary to effectively fulfill this mandate; the
interaction of the tribunal with other elements of the administrative
system; whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature; and practical
considerations including its capacity to consider legal questions.
However, practical considerations cannot override a clear implication in the statute itself, and the adjudicative nature of the tribunal is not
determinative. If a tribunal has authority to decide questions of law, it
can go beyond the enabling statute and decide issues of common law,
statutory interpretation, and Charter challenges. The burden is on the
party challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction to establish that the presumption has been rebutted by showing that the legislature clearly intended to exclude Charter issues from the questions of law to be
addressed.
The decision in Paul builds upon Martin by making it clear that tribunals with authority to consider legal questions must take into account
all applicable federal and provincial legal rules in applying their constituent legislation. Thus, the Forest Appeals Commission had authority
to hear and determine the defence of aboriginal rights.
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VII. GUIDELINES FOR GRANTING REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 24(1)
1. Introduction
Guidelines for granting remedies under section 24(1) have developed more slowly than those for section 52(1) remedies. The starting
point is the Supreme Court’s decision in Mills (1986).205 As noted
above, the issue was whether a preliminary inquiry court could grant a
stay of proceedings to remedy the breach of the accused’s right to be
tried within a reasonable time. Justice McIntyre held that the Charter did
not create courts of competent jurisdiction; section 24(1) simply vests
additional powers in courts which are already competent independent of
the Charter, because they have jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, and authority to make the order sought.206
Justice McIntyre also considered the remedies available under section 24(1), which simply provides that the court may issue such remedy
as it considers “appropriate and just in the circumstances.” He stated
that it “is difficult to imagine language which could give the court a
wider and less fettered discretion. It is impossible to reduce this wide
discretion to some sort of binding formula for general application in all
cases, and it is not for appellate courts to pre-empt or cut down this wide
discretion.”207 For example, no court can say that a stay of proceedings
will always be the appropriate remedy in a particular type of case; “the
circumstances will be infinitely variable from case to case and the remedy will vary with the circumstances.”208 The section 24(1) remedy will
also depend on the statutory or inherent jurisdiction of the court or
tribunal.
Since remedies are both discretionary and variable, it has taken
some time to develop guidelines for the interpretation and application of
section 24(1). The most helpful Supreme Court decision is DoucetBoudreau,209 released in November of 2003. The Court also considered
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this issue in Dunedin,210 which was released two years earlier in
December 2001.
2. Dunedin
The issue in Dunedin was whether a justice of the peace, sitting as a
trial judge under the Provincial Offences Act, had authority to order
costs against the Crown for breaching the accused’s Charter right to full
disclosure of evidence.211 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the
unanimous Court, began with the Mills criteria that a section 24(1) court
must have jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, and authority to grant the remedy sought. She added four related propositions
that inform the interpretation of section 24(1).
First, the provision must be given a broad and purposive, or large
and liberal interpretation. Indeed, “the language of this provision appears to confer the widest possible discretion on a court to craft remedies for violations of Charter rights… [that] should not be frustrated by
a ‘[n]arrow and technical’ reading …”212 Second, section 24(1) “must be
interpreted in a manner that provides a full, effective and meaningful
remedy for Charter violations.”213 Third, section 24(1) and section 24(2)
must be read harmoniously together, and the phrase “court of competent
jurisdiction” must be interpreted in a way that produces just and workable results under both provisions.214 Fourth, these provisions should not
be read so broadly that they confer authority that courts and tribunals
were never intended to have.215 As stated in Mills, the jurisdiction of
courts and tribunals is fixed by the legislatures, not by judges.
Chief Justice McLachlin added that the “framers of the Charter did
not intend to erase the constitutional distinctions between different types
of courts, nor to intrude on legislative powers more than necessary to
210
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achieve the aims of the Charter.”216 A court interpreting section 24 must
“achieve a broad, purposive interpretation that facilitates direct access to
appropriate and just Charter remedies … while respecting the structure
and practice of the existing court system and the exclusive role of Parliament and the legislatures in prescribing the jurisdiction of courts and
tribunals.”217 She then articulated a “functional and structural” approach
for determining if a statutory court or administrative tribunal has jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought, which is addressed below.
3. Doucet-Boudreau
(a) The Facts
The most helpful case on the application of section 24(1),
Doucet-Boudreau,218 involved a Nova Scotia Supreme Court Judge who
ordered the provincial government to use its best efforts to provide secondary level French language programs and educational facilities by
specified dates.219 The sole issue before the Supreme Court of Canada
was whether he had jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the Charter to
hear periodic reports on the government’s progress toward fulfilling this
order. The reporting requirement raised the very issues addressed in
McLachlin C.J.’s Weir Memorial Lecture. In the course of dealing with
these issues, the Court developed guidelines for granting section 24(1)
remedies.
The claimants were Francophone parents220 who had lobbied the
government throughout the 1990s to enforce their Charter-protected
French language education rights. In 1996, the government created a
French school board and announced that new French schools would be
built. However, construction never began, and the projects were officially put on hold in 1999 when the province was undergoing financial
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difficulties, and there was divided public opinion regarding the need for
French schools and programs. The litigation was commenced in 1998,
as the last resort of frustrated Francophone parents who were watching
the assimilation of their children in violation of their section 23 Charter
rights that had been entrenched, but not enforced, for 16 years.221
In his decision released in June 2000, LeBlanc J. found that the real
issue between the parties was the date on which French language programs and facilities would be implemented.222 The government did not
challenge entitlement; “[i]t simply delayed fulfilling its obligations
despite reports that assimilation was reaching critical levels.”223 It failed
to give sufficient priority to the fact that Charter rights were at stake,224
and that the purpose of minority language education is to help prevent
further assimilation and preserve French language and culture.
The trial judge disposed of the application in a three-part order, and
did not reserve judgment on any issue.225 First, he made a declaration
that the claimants’ section 23 rights had been breached, since the province did not fulfill its obligation to take positive steps to provide substantive equality in education for the children of the linguistic minority
where numbers warranted.226 Second, he held that they were entitled to
publicly funded secondary level French language programs and educational facilities without unreasonable delay,227 and issued a mandatory
injunction ordering the government to use its best efforts to comply by
specified dates, which ranged from September 2000 to September 2001
depending on location.228
The third component of the order was a requirement that the parties
appear before the trial judge periodically to report on the progress of
the government’s efforts to comply with his “best efforts” order. This
221
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provision was added in response to the claimants’ request that the trial
judge retain jurisdiction for the period required for compliance, in order
to avoid becoming functus officio.229 The final order simply stated that
“[t]he Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear reports from the Respondents respecting the Respondents’ compliance with this Order. The
Respondents shall report to this Court on … such … date as the Court
may determine.”230 The trial judge scheduled the first appearance for the
month after the decision was released and stated “at that time the respondents will report on the status of their efforts.”231 The order did not
contain any details regarding the form and content of the reports, the
evidence required or the procedure that would be followed. Since there
were no fresh proceedings to enforce the order, there were no established parameters under the rules of practice.
Nonetheless, five reporting sessions were held over the nine-month
period following the decision. Justice LeBlanc required an official from
the Department of Education to appear at each session, and to file an
affidavit that described the government’s progress in complying with his
mandatory order. Cross-examinations were permitted, as were rebuttal
affidavits. The matters covered included the type of construction of the
school facilities, whether new facilities would be built or existing buildings would be renovated, and details such as the type of ventilation
system that would be used.232 The order was similar in many ways to the
structural injunctions issued by American courts, and considered by
McLachlin C.J. in the Weir Memorial Lecture. The majority in the
Court of Appeal described the trial judge’s role as that of a referee or
administrator, while the dissenting judge233 called it “mediation on an
impressive scale…”234 in which the judge made no orders, but presided
while the parties worked out compromises. The province objected
throughout that the trial judge had no jurisdiction since he was functus
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officio,235 while LeBlanc J. maintained that he had authority to require
reports pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter.236
The reporting order achieved what the Court set out to do; it ensured
prompt compliance to reduce the risk that minority language education
rights would be forever lost because of additional procedural delays.237
For example, after a nine-month delay, the province called for tenders
eight days before the first reporting session, and ensured that a construction schedule was in place for the hearing.238 By the time the last meeting was held in March of 2001, there had been enough progress that the
main issue under consideration was whether any more reporting sessions were needed.239 Most deadlines were met, and when the Court of
Appeal rendered its decision in June 2001, the final school building
required to fulfill the order was being renovated.
(b) The Court of Appeal
The government appealed the reporting requirement, challenging the
authority of LeBlanc J. to remain seized of the matter after he rendered
judgment. It argued that under the common law doctrine of functus
officio, the trial judge had no jurisdiction to retain authority over the
implementation of his own order, to rehear the matter, or to continue
hearings. Further, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court could not reopen a
final decision because the power to rehear was vested in the Court of
Appeal under the Judicature Act.240 The government also argued that
if the authority to retain jurisdiction did exist, the courts ought to
exercise judicial restraint and avoid making orders that require ongoing
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supervision.241 The main concern appeared to be that the reporting process had no form or focus when compared to an application to enforce a
court order. As for the Charter, the government argued that when trial
judges grant remedies under section 24(1), they cannot enlarge their
jurisdiction by holding reporting hearings. The claimants asserted that
these hearings were within the authority of a superior court to craft a
remedy under section 24(1).242
It is some measure of the amount of disagreement over the reporting
order that it was struck down by the Court of Appeal by a two-one majority, but was reinstated by a five-four majority in the Supreme Court
of Canada. The two appellate courts, and the majority and dissenting
judges within each court, reached diametrically opposed conclusions. A
total of six appeal judges243 supported the reporting order while six244
opposed it. The competing approaches are illustrated in the majority and
dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.
Justice Flinn, writing for the majority, held that once trial judges decide the issues between the parties and make orders that dispose of all
matters under reserve, they do not have jurisdiction to remain seized of
the case in order to determine whether the government complies with
their decisions.245 He found that “the Charter does not extend the jurisdiction of these courts from a procedural point of view … Ordering a
remedy is one thing. Providing for its enforcement is quite another
…”246 Justice Flinn agreed with McLachlin C.J.’s comments in the Weir
Memorial Lecture, that American constitutional practices should not be
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lightly adopted in Canada,247 and that our courts should avoid confrontation with governments through judicial restraint and mutual deference
and cooperation.248 He concluded that Canadian courts should “assume
that government will comply with Charter remedies which the courts
order.”249 The reporting hearings were unnecessary since there was no
evidence that the government would fail to comply, and the claimants
could have commenced fresh proceedings to enforce the order.250
Justice Freeman, in dissent, wrote that the reporting order was “an
exemplary remedy”251 and “a pragmatic approach to getting the job done
expeditiously,”252 virtually on time, and with minimum inconvenience
and unnecessary cost. It contained a “creative blending”253 of a declaration of Charter rights, a mandatory injunction, and a mediation mechanism that gave life to section 23 Charter rights.254 The trial judge’s order
was not final, and he was not functus, until supervision of the mandatory
injunction was complete. He “was entitled to keep his judgment from
becoming final, and to remain seized with jurisdiction, by the simple
expedient of declaring that he was doing so.”255 Justice Freeman rejected the argument that courts should not make orders requiring ongoing supervision, since parties can always apply to the courts for
enforcement of an order.256 The case could have dragged on if the claimants had to bring fresh proceedings every time the government appeared
not to be using its best efforts, and delay could have undermined section
23 rights since continued assimilation could have reduced the number of
students below that required to exercise section 23 rights. Further, section 23 imposes positive obligations on governments, which will bring
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will bring the courts, parties, and educational institutions into ongoing
relationships.257
(c) The Supreme Court of Canada
The case was moot by the time it reached the Supreme Court of
Canada, since all the schools had been built by then. Nonetheless, all
members of the Court agreed that the case should be heard.258 Ultimately, the reporting order was upheld by a narrow margin of five to
four judges. Justices Iacobucci and Arbour wrote joint reasons for the
majority which included McLachlin C.J.,259 while LeBel and Deschamps JJ. wrote joint reasons on behalf of the dissenting judges.260
The majority emphasized the need for a generous and expansive interpretation of Charter remedies, rather than a narrow or technical approach that could undermine the full benefit and protection of Charter
rights.261 They relied on McLachlin C.J.’s reasons in Dunedin262 for the
proposition that section 24(1) must be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner because it is a vital part of the Charter, it is a remedial
provision, and its language confers broad discretion to craft remedies. A
purposive approach is necessary since a right is only as meaningful as
the remedy for its breach. This approach requires that: “First, the purpose of the right being protected must be promoted: courts must craft
responsive remedies. Second, the purpose of the remedies provision
must be promoted: courts must craft effective remedies.”263
257
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The majority and the dissenting judges agreed on the purpose and
scope of the rights at stake.264 Section 23 is a means to preserve and
promote French and English language and culture by ensuring each
language flourishes in provinces where it is not that of the majority.265 It
was also designed to correct past injustice by halting erosion and actively promoting minority official languages. This is a distinctively
Canadian provision that imposes positive obligations on governments to
provide resources, pass legislation, and develop institutional structures.266
These rights are particularly vulnerable to government inaction or
delay, since assimilation can increase to the point where the numbers no
longer warrant minority language education. Therefore, the “affirmative
promise contained in s. 23 of the Charter and the critical need for timely
compliance will sometimes require courts to order affirmative remedies
to guarantee that language rights are meaningfully, and therefore necessarily promptly, protected.”267
(d) The Dissenting Reasons
While there was broad agreement on section 23 rights, the dissenting judges held that the reporting order itself was void for three reasons.
First, it was inconsistent with the principles of procedural fairness.268
Since there are penalties for failure to comply with injunctions, the
parties must be given proper notice of their obligations. The reporting
order in this case failed to specify the nature, content, or format of the
reports, or the procedural guidelines for the hearings.269
The second reason the dissentients found the order void was that a
court which purports to oversee implementation of a final order is acting
when its jurisdiction is exhausted, in breach of the functus officio
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doctrine.270 Functus officio means that a court has no jurisdiction to
reopen or amend a final decision, unless there has been an error in drafting the judgment or in expressing the intention of the court. The underlying rationale is that “there must be finality to a proceeding to ensure
procedural fairness and the integrity of the judicial system.”271 The
dissenting judges found the reporting requirement changed the final
order when the trial judge was functus.
The third reason they opposed the order was that a court overseeing
or supervising implementation of its final order is attempting to extend
its jurisdiction beyond its proper role, and is in breach of the separation
of powers principle.272 They held that while there is no formal division
of powers between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of
government, the separation of powers is entrenched in our Constitution.273 There is a clear distinction between the courts on one hand, and
the closely intertwined legislative and executive branches on the
other.274 Cooperation and mutual respect between the branches are at the
core of the Canadian constitutional order.275
The dissentients held that the separation of powers protects the independence of the judiciary and permits it to discharge its duties,276
which are to declare what the law is, contribute to its development, and
provide relief for breach of claimants’ rights.277 However, once a court
issues a remedy under section 24(1), it should exercise restraint and
presume that the government will act with reasonable diligence and in
good faith to rectify the Charter defect, given our tradition of government compliance with judicial interpretations of the law and court
270

Id., at para. 105.
Id., at para. 114, citing Sopinka J. in Chandler v. Assn. of Architects (Alberta), supra, note 240, at 861-62.
272
Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at paras. 105, 117.
273
Id., at para. 107.
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Id., at para. 108, citing Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 68, and Fraser v.
Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, [1985] S.C.J. No. 71, at 469-70
[S.C.R.].
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Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 121, citing Vriend, supra, note 12. The dissentients relied on McLachlin C.J.’s comments in the Weir Memorial Lecture, supra, note 4,
regarding the tradition of judicial restraint, cooperation among the branches of government,
and the importance of institutional legitimacy.
276
Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 108, citing Provincial Judges Reference, supra,
note 68, and Mackin, supra, note 10.
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orders. The executive should retain autonomy to choose among policy
alternatives that conform to the Charter.278 An injunction might be necessary279 if it is the only way to vindicate a claimant’s rights, or if a
government has upset the constitutional balance by ignoring less intrusive judicial measures. Otherwise, “increased judicial intervention in
public administration will rarely be appropriate.”280
In the dissenting judges’ view, there were alternatives such as expedited contempt proceedings before another judge,281 and there was no
suggestion that the government ignored less intrusive judicial measures.282 Instead, the trial judge assumed a supervisory and administrative
function that properly belonged to the executive283 and was beyond the
institutional capacity of the judiciary.284 Further, if the reporting hearings were intended to put pressure on the government, they constituted
political activity which is the function of the opposition party, not the
courts.285 A construction deadline with the possibility of a contempt
order would have provided as much incentive as the reporting hearings,
without politicizing the relationship between the courts and the executive.286 The dissent concluded that the remedy was not appropriate and
just since it was inconsistent with basic legal principles and constitutional doctrines.287
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Id., at paras. 123-24. Indeed, the courts have acknowledged that the legislatures and
executive are in the best position to make these choices.
279
Id., at para. 134.
280
Id., at para. 140.
281
Id., at paras. 136-37, citing Dunedin, supra, note 15, at para. 22. Note that the dissenting judges opined at para. 138 that it was difficult to imagine any circumstances in which
breach of a party’s right to notice would assist in the vindication of the other party’s Charter
rights.
282
The dissenting judges found that the government did not know what its obligations
were under s. 23 of the Charter, although the trial judge explicitly found that the real issue
was when s. 23 requirements would be satisfied.
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Doucet-Boudreau SCC, supra, note 14, at para. 111.
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Id., at paras. 110, 120, citing Eldridge, supra, note 42, at para. 96.
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Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 128.
286
Id., at paras. 130-33, 143, citing Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 68, at
paras. 139-40. As the dissenting judges put it at para. 132, “[i]f the reporting hearings were
intended to hold ‘the Province’s feet to the fire’, the character of the relationship between the
judiciary and the executive was improperly altered….”
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(e) The Majority’s Decision
The majority concluded that the trial judge’s reporting order meaningfully protected and implemented the claimants’ section 23 rights
while maintaining respect for the executive and legislative branches of
government.288 Like the dissenting judges, they identified the key issue
as the proper role of courts. They took note of the Canadian tradition
and fundamental constitutional value of governments and private parties
voluntarily complying with court orders. This is especially important
when the courts must ensure that governments comply with the Constitution, while observing the functional separation between the branches
of government.289 The majority held that courts must be sensitive to
their role, “and not fashion remedies which usurp the role of the other
branches of governance by taking on tasks to which other persons or
bodies are better suited.”290 However, “the boundaries of the courts’
proper role … cannot be reduced to a simple test or formula; it will vary
according to the right at issue and the context of each case.”291
The majority found that the nature and extent of the remedies available under section 24(1) may be limited by the wording of the provision,
which must be read in harmony with the rest of the Constitution, and by
other constitutional provisions.292 A section 24(1) remedy is available
for government inaction, such as the failure to mobilize resources to
provide section 23 school facilities in a timely manner.293 The language
of section 24(1) confers a broad and unfettered discretion that cannot be
reduced to a formula that is binding in all cases. Nor can this discretion
be pre-empted or reduced by courts of appeal.294 A party challenging a
Charter remedy granted by a section 96 court must establish that the
remedy is not appropriate and just in the circumstances.
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Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id. at para. 37.
Id., at paras. 31-33.
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Id., at para. 34. As the majority put it at para. 36, judicial “[d]eference ends …
where the constitutional rights … begin,” and cited McLachlin C.J. in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, at para. 136 [S.C.R.].
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Unlike the dissenting judges, the majority held that since the remedial power of the superior courts under section 24(1) is part of the Constitution, which is the supreme law of Canada, it cannot be strictly
limited by statutory or common law rules or principles such as judicial
restraint, the dialogue theory, or the doctrine of functus officio.
“[J]udicial restraint and metaphors such as ‘dialogue’ must not be elevated to the level of strict constitutional rules to which the words of
s. 24 can be subordinated.”295 However, these sources may be helpful in
choosing a section 24 remedy insofar as they express principles that are
relevant to what is appropriate and just in the circumstances.296 The
court in a particular case must give meaning to these words. It must
exercise its discretion on the basis of the nature of the right, the nature
of the infringement, the facts of the case, and the relevant legal principles.297 The court should also take into account five broad considerations in determining what remedy to grant.
•

•

•

First, the remedy must meaningfully vindicate the claimant’s Charter rights taking into account the nature of the right and the claimant’s situation. It “must be relevant to the experience of the claimant
and must address the circumstances in which the right was infringed
or denied.”298
Second, the remedy must be legitimate for a court in a constitutional
democracy. It must respect the division of authority between the
branches of government. The “courts must not … depart unduly or
unnecessarily from their role of adjudicating disputes and granting
remedies that address the matter of those disputes.”299
Third, the remedy must be “a judicial one which vindicates the right
while invoking the function and powers of a court. It will not be appropriate for a court to leap into the kinds of decisions and functions
for which its design and expertise are manifestly unsuited.”300 The
capacity and competence of courts can be partly inferred from their
tasks, procedures, and precedents.
295
296
297
298
299
300
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Fourth, the remedy must not only vindicate the right of the claimant;
it must also be fair to the party against whom it is made. It “should
not impose substantial hardships that are unrelated to securing the
right.”301
Finally, “the judicial approach to remedies must remain flexible and
responsive to the needs of a given case.”302 Section 24 is part of a
constitutional scheme to vindicate fundamental Charter rights, and
its evolution may require novel and creative approaches that depart
from traditional and historical practice.

The majority concluded that the trial judge properly took into account the factual circumstances in exercising his remedial discretion.
His reporting order satisfied the first guideline by meaningfully vindicating the claimants’ section 23 Charter rights in a context of serious
rates of assimilation that could further endanger linguistic rights, and a
history of government delay in providing French language education. If
there had not been reporting hearings, the claimants would have had to
commence a new court proceeding whenever there was an additional
delay, which would have taken considerable time and resources from
people who had already invested a great deal to enforce their section 23
rights. The majority found the trial judge’s pragmatic and expeditious
approach was “a creative blending of remedies and processes already
known to the courts in order to give life to the right in s. 23.”303
The trial judge could have granted a declaration of the rights of the
parties, but the rationale for such an order is that the government will
comply promptly and fully. The general content of section 23 rights had
already been settled in previous decisions, and the real issue in this case
was the date when the programs and facilities would be implemented.304
The majority held that “[w]here governments have failed to comply with
their well-understood constitutional obligations to take positive action in
support of the right in s. 23, the assumption underlying a preference for

301
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declarations may be undermined.”305 The trial judge considered a declaration, and was entitled to conclude it was not appropriate in this case.
Further, the majority doubted the government would have been more
respectful of contempt proceedings.306 They concluded it was appropriate to grant the remedy that would lead to prompt compliance, and avoid
the risk of additional procedural delay.307
With respect to the second guideline, the majority held that the remedy took into account, and did not unduly depart from the role of the
courts in a constitutional democracy.308 The trial judge considered the
government’s progress, preserved and reinforced its role in providing
school facilities without compromising the parents’ rights, and built in
some flexibility with a “best efforts” clause. The majority stated that
“[t]o some extent, the legitimate role of the court vis-à-vis various institutions of government will depend on the circumstances.”309 In this case
it was appropriate to craft a remedy that vindicated the rights of the
parents but left detailed choices of means to the executive. The majority
held that courts may clearly grant injunctions against governments, and
that the power to do so “is central to s. 24(1) of the Charter which envisions more than declarations of rights. Courts do take actions to ensure
that rights are enforced, and not merely declared”;310 for example, with
contempt proceedings, garnishments, and writs of seizure and sale.
The third guideline was also met; the order was judicial in that it
called upon functions and powers known to the courts, which often
continue to be involved in the relationship between the parties. Superior
courts have taken active managerial roles in exercising the traditional
powers of courts of equity, and equitable remedies have been developed
to support the litigation process such as Mareva injunctions and Anton
Piller orders that preserve evidence and assets before trial. Courts have
ongoing jurisdiction and supervisory powers in bankruptcy, receivership, trusts, estates, and family law matters, and where they have ordered
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Id., at para. 66, discussing Mahe, supra, note 257, at 393.
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specific performance or issued mandatory injunctions. 311 In addition,
the Supreme Court remained seized of the Manitoba Language Rights
Reference during the implementation of constitutional language
rights,312 and lower courts have retained jurisdiction in section 23
cases.313
The majority concluded that “the range of remedial orders available
to courts in civil proceedings demonstrates that constitutional remedies
involving some degree of ongoing supervision do not represent a radical
break with the past practices of courts.”314 Under section 24(1) of the
Charter, the flexibility of equitable remedies may be applied to orders
requiring governments to vindicate constitutional rights. The reporting
order in this case was not inconsistent with the judicial function;315 the
trial judge was hearing evidence and supervising cross-examinations on
progress reports, not managing and coordinating construction projects.
The majority also found that while statutory and common law rules
cannot pre-empt the remedial discretion conferred by section 24(1), the
doctrine of functus officio addresses the functions and powers of courts,
and is therefore useful in determining whether the order was appropriately judicial.316 The functus doctrine applies when the judge’s function
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Id., at para. 71.
See Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, supra, note 245; and [1985] 2 S.C.R.
347, [1985] S.C.J. No. 70 (Order No. 1); and [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1417, [1990] S.C.J. No. 142
(Order No. 2); and [1992] 1 S.C.R. 212 (Order No. 3). The dissenting judges took the position
in Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 144, that the trial judge’s order was not consistent with
the Supreme Court’s retention of jurisdiction in Reference re Manitoba Language Rights,
because the Court sought the government’s assistance in fashioning a remedy. In their view,
the Court did not purport to supervise compliance or oversee administrative action; instead, it
respected the executive’s ability to make the necessary policy choices that complied with the
Charter.
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Assoc. des parents francophones (Columbie-Britannique) v. British Columbia, supra, note 245, at 380; Lavoie, supra, note 245, at 593-95; Société des Acadiens du NouveauBrunswick Inc. v. Minority Language School Board No. 50, supra, note 245, at para. 109.
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“Charter Remedies: The Structural Injunction” (1989-90) 11 Advocates’ Q. 190, at 217-18;
Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994), at paras.
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has been exhausted, to ensure finality so that litigants have a stable base
for an appeal. The majority found that the trial judge was not functus in
this case. While he retained jurisdiction to hear progress reports, he did
not retain authority to alter the final disposition on the scope and violation of section 23 rights or to modify the injunction,317 so he did not
undermine the stable base from which to appeal.318 Further, rules of
practice allow courts to vary their orders or provide additional relief to
make them effective without undermining the right to appeal,319 and
nothing in the Judicature Act prevented the trial judge from hearing
reports on the implementation of an order.320
With respect to the fourth guideline, the majority found that the reporting order was not unfair to the government. It was not so vaguely
worded as to make it invalid. While the trial judge could have provided
more guidance regarding what the parties could expect in the reporting
hearings, his order was not incomprehensible or impossible to follow.321
It clearly communicated that the government had to attend at court to
report on the status of its efforts to provide the facilities and programs
ordered at trial. However, the majority noted that similar orders in future
cases should be more explicit and detailed with respect to the jurisdiction retained by the trial judge and the procedure to be followed at reporting hearings. They noted that an alternative is to specify a timetable
and permit the government to seek variation if it is appropriate and
just.322
The fifth guideline — that courts must issue responsive remedies
which guarantee full and meaningful protection of Charter rights — may
require novel remedies, especially for the enforcement of section 23
rights. A superior court may issue any remedy it considers appropriate
and just in the circumstances, but it should bear in mind its role as a
constitutional arbiter and the limits of its institutional capacity. “Reviewing courts, for their part, must show considerable deference to trial
judges’ choice of remedy, and should refrain from using hindsight to
perfect a remedy. A reviewing court should only interfere where the trial
317
318
319
320
321
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judge has committed an error of law or principle.”323 The claimants were
awarded full costs on a solicitor-client basis throughout, including those
of the reporting hearings, since they had been consistently denied their
Charter rights by a province that was fully aware of the content of those
rights.324
4. Summary
There has been little guidance on the interpretation of section 24(1).
The leading cases are the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mills (1986),325
Dunedin (2001),326 and Doucet-Boudreau SCC (2003).327 Justice McIntyre held in Mills that the language of section 24(1) gives the courts a
wide and unfettered discretion, which cannot be reduced to a binding
formula that applies in all cases, or pre-empted by appellate courts. The
remedy will vary depending on the facts and circumstances of the case,
and the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal.
In Dunedin, McLachlin C.J. added four propositions that inform the
interpretation of section 24(1). First, this provision must be given a
broad and purposive, or large and liberal interpretation. Second, it must
be interpreted to provide full, effective, and meaningful remedies for
Charter violations. Third, section 24(1) and section 24(2) must be read
together, and a “court of competent jurisdiction” must be interpreted to
produce just and workable results for both provisions. Fourth, these
provisions should not be read so as to confer authority that courts and
tribunals were never intended to have; courts must facilitate direct access to appropriate and just remedies while respecting their existing
structure and practice, and without intruding upon legislative powers.
Doucet-Boudreau went further, since the trial judge appeared to invade legislative and executive authority by requiring progress reports on
the province’s efforts to fulfill his order to provide French language educational programs and facilities. The order raised the spectre of the American structural or administrative injunctions referred to in McLachlin
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C.J.’s Weir Memorial Lecture; the trial judge was involved in the construction of schools, down to the choice of ventilation systems. The
government argued that the order was procedurally unfair since it did
not provide sufficient notice of what was required at the reporting hearings, the trial judge had no jurisdiction to hear reports because he was
functus officio, and the Court breached the constitutional division of
powers by intruding upon the enforcement functions of the legislative
and executive branches of government.
The majority upheld the trial judge’s reporting order. They found
that the words “appropriate and just” must be given a broad, liberal, and
flexible interpretation that promotes Charter rights and the purposes of
section 24(1) by crafting responsive and effective remedies. Further, the
principles of procedural fairness and judicial restraint, the doctrine of
functus officio, and the dialogue theory cannot be raised to the level of
constitutional principles that limit the interpretation of the section 24(1)
remedial authority of a provincial superior court. However, the courts
must be sensitive to their role under the Constitution, and not issue
orders that usurp the functions of the executive and legislative branches
of government.
The majority in Doucet-Boudreau set out five broad guidelines that
a court must keep in mind when it is issuing a remedy under section
24(1) of the Charter. First, the remedy must vindicate the breach of
Charter rights. Second, the court must be mindful of its traditional constitutional role. Third, the remedy must be a judicial remedy. Fourth, it
must be fair to the respondent. Fifth, remedies must remain flexible and
responsive to the issues. The majority concluded that the reporting order
was a creative blend of remedies and processes that were known to the
courts and gave life to the claimants’ section 23 rights.

VIII. JURISDICTION TO GRANT REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 24(1)
1. The Early Decisions
Historically, superior courts had original jurisdiction to hear all
cases regardless of the subject matter, while local courts had only the
authority specifically conferred upon them by statute, and were subject
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to review by superior courts if they exceeded their express jurisdiction.
This structure continues today with the added constitutional restraint of
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.328 The question is which of
these statutory and superior courts qualify as courts of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of granting an appropriate and just remedy under
section 24(1) for the breach of Charter rights arising from government
action?
The starting point is McIntyre J.’s statement in Mills,329 that “… a
court is competent if it has jurisdiction, conferred by statute, over the
person and the subject matter in question and, in addition, has authority
to make the order sought.”330 In that case, a preliminary inquiry was not
a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a remedy
under section 24(1). The judge’s sole function was to decide whether
there was sufficient evidence to warrant committal for trial,331 and the
Court had no jurisdiction to acquit, convict, impose a penalty, grant a
remedy, or hear and determine questions regarding infringement of
Charter rights.332 Therefore, the Court could not address the section
11(b) Charter issue, which had to be heard by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court also held in Mills that the trial court is usually
the court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of section 24(1)
because it has jurisdiction, independent of the Charter, over the person
and the subject, as well as authority to grant a full range of criminal law
remedies. The trial judge also has an extensive factual basis upon which
to decide a Charter issue.333 In addition, a superior court has concurrent
original jurisdiction to remedy Charter breaches, and discretion to decline to exercise that jurisdiction. This is the appropriate court to address
Charter issues where an accused person has not made an election and no
trial court has been established, or where the trial judge caused the violation of the constitutional right.334
328

I do not address the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in this paper.
Supra, note 7.
330
Id., at 960. As noted above, McIntyre J. adopted the Ontario Court of Appeal’s approach in R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 50, at 271, and the other members of the Court
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333
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The circumstances in which an accused should apply to the superior
court were addressed in Rahey and in Smith,335 both of which involved
complaints of delay. In Rahey, a Provincial Court judge heard evidence
and the accused’s application for a directed verdict. He then adjourned
for eleven months and rendered judgment only after the Crown and the
accused applied separately to the superior court for relief. Justice Lamer,
writing for the majority in the Supreme Court, repeated that a trial court
is generally the appropriate forum in which to seek a remedy under
section 24(1), although superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction.
Further, superior courts should not exercise jurisdiction unless they
are better suited to assess the claim and grant a remedy in a particular
case; for example, where no trial court has been established and a remedy is needed on a timely basis, and where the lower court process infringes the accused’s Charter rights.336 In Rahey the superior court
properly exercised jurisdiction because the trial judge was responsible
for the delay.
The superior court also properly agreed to hear an application for a
stay of proceedings in Smith, since the accused’s preliminary inquiry
had been delayed for eleven months, and was scheduled to begin in
another four months. The unanimous Supreme Court reiterated that trial
judges generally should deal with section 11(b) Charter violations.
However, the superior court was the appropriate forum in this case,
since the preliminary hearing judge was not a court of competent jurisdiction under section 24(1). If the accused had been committed for trial
at the preliminary inquiry, further delay would have ensued before a
trial judge could have addressed the issue.337

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34; now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 which embody the essential
historical features of the original Court of Kings’s Bench in England.
335
Both supra, note 96.
336
Rahey, id., at 603-604. The burden is on the claimant to establish that the application
is appropriate for the superior court’s consideration.
337
See also Seaboyer, supra, note 96, in which the majority held that preliminary inquiry judges do not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of legislation
because the Criminal Code does not authorize them to deal with constitutional questions.
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2. Administrative Tribunals under Section 24(1)
The approach in Mills has been applied to administrative tribunals
that have exclusive initial jurisdiction with respect to particular matters.
For example, in Weber v. Ontario Hydro,338 an employee filed grievances under a collective agreement, and commenced an action in the
superior court claiming damages and a declaration for breach of Charter
rights. Justice McLachlin, for the majority, held that the arbitrator satisfied the Mills test and constituted a court of competent jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the Charter; he had jurisdiction over the parties and
the dispute under the collective agreement, as well as power to apply the
law including the Charter, and he had authority to award damages and a
declaration. Therefore, he had exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of
the dispute, and the court could not entertain a parallel action.339
However, the Supreme Court found that the National Parole Board
was not a section 24 court in Mooring v. Canada (National Parole
Board).340 An inmate who had been released from prison on mandatory
supervision was charged with several offences. Even though the charges
were stayed, the Board revoked his statutory release. Justice Sopinka,
for the majority, concluded that the Board was not a court of competent
jurisdiction for the purpose of excluding evidence, given its structure
and function, as well as the language of its constituent statute.341 The
Board did not act in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner. Its members did
not have to be legally trained, and it held inquisitorial hearings where
counsel served a limited function. Its process was substantially different
from that of a traditional court; for example, the rules of proof and evidence did not apply, and the Board did not have authority to issue subpoenas. Further, the enabling statute342 conferred a broad mandate to
take all available relevant information into account, particularly factors
concerning the protection of society. Therefore, “… neither the Board
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Id., at paras. 55-56. See also para. 67, where the majority held that if a remedy was
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tribunal could not grant.
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itself nor the proceedings … [were] designed to engage in the balancing
of factors that s. 24(2) demands.”343
3. The Functional and Structural Test in Dunedin
The jurisdiction of statutory criminal courts was considered in the
companion cases of Hynes and Dunedin.344 The lead decision is Dunedin, in which McLachlin C.J. concluded on behalf of the unanimous
Court that a justice of the peace presiding at a trial under the Provincial
Offences Act (POA) had authority to order legal costs against the Crown
for breaching the accused’s Charter rights by failing to make full disclosure of evidence. The starting point was the Mills test, that a section 24
court must have jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter, the person, and the remedy sought.345 Chief Justice McLachlin added a “functional and structural” approach for determining if a statutory court or
administrative tribunal has jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought.
The central question “is whether the legislator endowed the court or
tribunal with the power to pronounce on Charter rights and to grant the
remedy sought for the breach of these rights.”346 Statutory bodies have
only the remedial powers that are expressly or impliedly granted to them
by their enabling legislation.347 Since most courts and tribunals were
established before the Charter was enacted, they generally will not have
express power to grant Charter remedies.348 Consequently, the question
becomes whether the court or tribunal is an appropriate forum for ordering the Charter remedy given its function and structure. “If so, it can
reasonably be inferred … that the legislature intended the court or tribunal
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to have this remedy at its disposal when confronted with Charter violations that arise in the course of its proceedings.”349
Put another way, if the legislature confers a function on a decision
maker that engages Charter issues, and it provides the decision maker
with procedures and processes that are capable of resolving these issues
in a fair and just manner, the presumption is that the legislature intended
the decision maker to exercise this power.350 The question is “whether
the court or tribunal … is suited to grant the remedy sought under s. 24
in light of its function and structure.”351 This requires a contextual assessment, and the weight of the relevant factors will vary depending on
the circumstances.
The function refers to the decision maker’s purpose or mandate.
“First, what is the court or tribunal’s function within the legislative
scheme? Would jurisdiction to order the remedy … frustrate or enhance
this role? How essential is the power to grant the remedy … to the effective and efficient functioning of the court or tribunal? Second, what is
the function of the court or tribunal in the broader legal system? Is it
more appropriate that a different forum redress the violation of Charter
rights?”352
The structure of the decision maker deals with the compatibility of
the institution and its processes with the remedy sought under section
24. The following operational factors may be salient depending upon the
remedy sought: “…whether the proceedings are judicial or quasijudicial; the role of counsel; the applicability or otherwise of traditional
rules of proof and evidence; whether the court or tribunal can issue
subpoenas; whether evidence is offered under oath; the expertise and
training of the decision-maker; and the institutional experience of the
court or tribunal with the remedy in question … the workload of the
court or tribunal, the time constraints it operates under, [and] its ability
to compile an adequate record for a reviewing court…”353
The question comes down to whether the legislature has given the
decision maker the tools that are needed to fashion the remedy sought
under section 24 in a just, fair and consistent manner, without under349
350
351
352
353
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mining its ability to perform its function.354 Administrative tribunals
raise difficult issues since their structure and functions vary widely.
Consequently, a tribunal’s constituent statute must be carefully reviewed, particularly with respect to the power to grant remedies.355
Another critical factor is whether the tribunal has the necessary safeguards that permit it to make fair and informed decisions on Charter
rights, and to award remedies for breach of these rights.356
Chief Justice McLachlin found that the functional and structural approach was consistent with the authorities — particularly Mills, Weber,357 and Mooring358 — which were dominated by the concern for
function and structure.359 It was also consistent with the pre-Martin test
for whether administrative tribunals had authority to entertain challenges to their constituent legislation under section 52(1),360 and with
the principles underlying section 24 in that it balanced meaningful access to Charter relief with deference to the role of the legislatures.361
“Whether … the legislature intended to exclude a particular remedial
power is determined by reference to the function the legislature has
asked the tribunal to perform and the powers and processes with which
it has furnished it.”362
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that provincial offences courts
have jurisdiction to award costs under section 24(1) as a remedy for
breach of the Charter right to timely disclosure. They are quasi-criminal
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courts that have the necessary information to craft a remedy, and a full
complement of criminal law remedial powers. Judicial standards, processes, and evidentiary rules apply at the hearing, and the decisions are
subject to appeal. There is also a direct connection between cost awards
for untimely disclosure and the function of a provincial offences court.
If the procedure was bifurcated and costs were left to a superior court,
the Charter claimant might be deprived of any remedy at all.363
The functional and structural test set out in Dunedin was applied in
the companion case of Hynes.364 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a
five-judge majority, held that a preliminary inquiry judge did not have
authority under section 24(2) to exclude statements obtained in violation
of the accused’s Charter rights. Mills held that a preliminary inquiry
serves a limited screening function and that the presiding judge does not
have jurisdiction to order a stay of proceedings, consider Charter questions, or grant Charter remedies including exclusion of evidence.365
Nevertheless, the majority reconsidered the issue under the functional and structural test in Dunedin, which was summarized as follows.
The starting point for identifying a court of competent jurisdiction is the
Mills test; the decision maker must have jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter, as well as authority to grant the remedy sought. With
respect to remedial authority, the “question in all cases is whether … the
legislature intended to empower the court or tribunal to make rulings on
Charter violations that arise incidentally to their proceedings, and to
grant the remedy sought as a remedy for such violations.”366 If the legislation does not expressly confer authority to grant remedies for Charter
infringements, the court must consider whether the decision maker is
suited to grant the remedy given its function and structure.367
Since the Criminal Code does not expressly confer authority on preliminary inquiry courts to grant remedies under section 24, the question
became whether the court was suited to grant the remedy of excluding
evidence in light of its function and structure. The primary function of a
preliminary inquiry court is to decide whether there is enough evidence
363
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to commit the accused for trial. Its ancillary function, which has developed over time, is discovery of the Crown’s case.368 Its structure, processes, and evidentiary rules are similar to those of a trial court, and
involuntary statements may be excluded at the preliminary inquiry under the common law confessions rule.
However, a preliminary inquiry court does not have the powers of a
trial court. In particular, the judge has no authority to grant remedies or
to exclude evidence under the Charter. The majority held that to confer
this authority would change the role of the preliminary inquiry from an
expeditious preliminary screening process to a forum for trying Charter
issues with the attendant costs and delays. The exclusion of involuntary
statements is a limited and discrete inquiry, whereas a decision to exclude evidence under section 24(2) is based on the full factual context
and the impact of the decision on the fairness of the trial and the administration of justice. The majority concluded that Parliament intended
Charter issues to be resolved at trial when all the relevant circumstances
can be weighed by the judge.369
4. Doucet-Boudreau
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on courts of competent jurisdiction under section 24 of the Charter is found in
Doucet-Boudreau.370 As noted above, the primary issue was whether a
superior court judge could retain jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the
Charter to hear periodic progress reports on efforts to fulfill his order
requiring the province to provide French programs and educational
facilities by specified dates. There was no issue of unconstitutional
legislation, or of government action; rather, the problem was government
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inaction through failure to mobilize resources and provide school facilities in a timely manner.
The majority held that a remedy is available under section 24(1) for
government inaction, as well as for government action that breaches
Charter rights.371 Section 24(1) guarantees that there will always be a
court of competent jurisdiction to hear and grant a remedy to a person
whose Charter rights have been infringed. The default court is the provincial superior court established by section 96 of the Constitution Act,
1867. Nothing in section 96, or in the jurisprudence describing the functions of section 96 courts, limits the inherent jurisdiction of the superior
courts or the statutory jurisdiction that can be conferred on them.372 Nor
did the decisions in Mills and Dunedin have any impact, since they dealt
with the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals or judges acting under
statutory authority, where the issue is what power the legislator intended
the tribunal to have under the Charter given the tribunal’s function and
structure.373 The Mills test does not apply to section 96 superior courts
since they were not created by statute, and they always “retain ‘constant,
complete, and concurrent jurisdiction’ to issue remedies under s. 24(1).”374
5. Summary
Section 24(1) guarantees that there will always be a court of competent jurisdiction to hear and grant a remedy to a person whose Charter
rights have been infringed. The question of whether a particular decision
maker has authority to grant a remedy under section 24(1) is especially
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sensitive where statutory criminal courts and administrative tribunals are
concerned. A section 24 remedy is available for government inaction as
well as for government action that breaches Charter rights.
The Mills test is the starting point; a court of competent jurisdiction
within the meaning of section 24 must have jurisdiction, independent of
the Charter, over the person and the subject matter, and authority to
make the order sought. In Dunedin the Court articulated a “functional
and structural” approach for determining if a decision maker has jurisdiction to grant a section 24 remedy. If legislation does not expressly
confer authority to grant remedies for Charter infringements, the court
must consider whether the decision maker is suited to grant the remedy
sought in light of its function and structure.
“Function” refers to the decision maker’s mandate or role, including
its function within the legal system, whether power to grant a section 24
remedy would undermine that role, and whether there is a more appropriate forum to remedy Charter violations. “Structure” refers to whether
the decision maker and its operational processes are compatible with
granting the remedy sought, taking into account the features of a judicial
or quasi-judicial body. In essence, the question is whether the legislature
has given the court or tribunal the tools that are necessary to craft the
remedy sought in a just, fair, and consistent manner without undermining its ability to perform its function.
Preliminary inquiry courts do not meet these requirements because
of their limited statutory jurisdiction. However, a trial court, including a
provincial offences court, does qualify as a section 24 court. The default
court is the provincial superior court which has concurrent original
jurisdiction to remedy Charter breaches, and discretion to decline to
exercise that jurisdiction. The Mills test does not apply to section 96
superior courts since they are courts of inherent jurisdiction that were
not created by statute, and they always retain constant, complete, and
concurrent jurisdiction to issue remedies under section 24(1). A superior
court should generally leave Charter issues to the trial court in the
criminal process, unless no trial court has been established, or the trial
court itself is responsible for the violation of the accused’s Charter
rights.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In her 1990 Weir Memorial Lecture, McLachlin C.J. discussed the
institutional challenges that courts faced in exercising their authority
under the Charter. When it came to remedies, the question was how the
courts could ensure their orders would be enforced. What would happen
if a court found that a law was unconstitutional or that government action infringed a person’s Charter rights, and the government did nothing
to respond? One answer in the United States was that courts issued
structural injunctions to enforce civil rights, and became public administrators in the process. Chief Justice McLachlin cautioned against this
solution, given the pitched battle that ensued between the American
judiciary and the other branches of government.
In her view, the Canadian answer was to be found in the tradition of
judicial restraint, and in continued cooperation and mutual respect between the courts and governments. The Court maintained from the beginning that it has explicit authority to make decisions regarding the
Charter, but it will not overstep its institutional competence by secondguessing policy decisions that governments are better able to make. For
their part, legislatures have reacted to court decisions striking down
legislation, by enacting new laws that achieve the same objective, but
with added safeguards that protect Charter rights as interpreted by the
courts. This is the essence of the dialogue theory, which provided a
working model of the relationship between the judiciary and legislatures
under the Charter built on democratic principles and the traditions identified by the Chief Justice.
There is little controversy over the remedial powers and jurisdiction
of provincial superior courts, but the reality is that most of Canada’s
legal business takes place before statutory courts and administrative
tribunals that have only the authority conferred upon them by legislation. These decision makers come in all shapes and sizes, with varying
mandates and vastly different levels of expertise. No matter what statutory authority the court or tribunal may have, the same policy concern
arises: Charter rights belong to the people of Canada, and the people
must be permitted to rely on these rights and raise them at the earliest
possible stage of legal proceedings.
This is the context or background against which we must consider
how much progress Canadian courts have made with respect to remedies
for breach of Charter rights. Remedies are not simply a procedural issue
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for litigation counsel; they are a litmus test for our progress under the
Charter as a whole. Elegant theories of substantive rights achieve little if
we do not have adequate remedies to enforce them. As McLachlin C.J.
said, “[w]ithout effective remedies, the law becomes an empty symbol;
full of sound and fury but signifying nothing.”375
When section 52(1) and section 24(1) were introduced in 1982, it
appeared that section 52(1) simply stated the principle of constitutional
supremacy, while section 24(1) provided for remedies without specifying what they would be or which bodies could grant them. However,
section 52(1) was quickly interpreted as authority for bodies that were
clearly not courts of competent jurisdiction to address Charter issues.
The range of remedies that are available under section 52(1) was established fairly early in the Schachter decision. However, it took considerable time, and some deviations in direction, to arrive at the Martin
guidelines for determining which bodies have jurisdiction to make decisions under section 52(1).
It has taken longer to develop general principles and guidelines under section 24(1). The principle that a section 24(1) court must have
jurisdiction over the person, the subject matter, and the remedy was
established in the Mills decision in 1986, but it did not provide much
assistance. Some progress was made with the “functional and structural
approach” set out in Dunedin in 2001, but the most significant advances
were not made until the Doucet-Boudreau decision was released late in
2003.
Two conclusions become apparent. First, Canadian remedial jurisprudence has moved to a point where superior courts may issue structural injunctions without the conflict that was experienced in the United
States. The reporting order in Doucet-Boudreau requiring progress reports on the government’s efforts to fulfill the trial judge’s order mirrored the American remedies addressed by Chief Justice McLachlin in
1990. In effect, the trial judge was involved in the construction of
schools, right down to the choice of ventilation systems. The order
worked through voluntary compliance, even though the government
believed that the trial judge did not have jurisdiction to make the order.
Programs and schools were delivered on schedule, and a long overdue
promise to give life to section 23 minority language rights was fulfilled.
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In her Weir Memorial Lecture, McLachlin C.J. said there “can be no
doubt that the Charter poses new and unprecedented problems for the
courts … in fashioning remedies which will at once be effective and
respectful of the powers of other branches of government. We can follow the route of confrontation, which has so often prevailed in the
United States. Or we can continue down the road of mutual deference
and cooperation between the judiciary and the legislatures upon which
we seem to have embarked … my hope lies with the latter.”376 As it
turns out, her words were prophetic. The concept of judicial restraint
and the tradition of mutual deference and cooperation have evolved in
the fourteen years since this lecture was delivered, but they remain the
key to the decision in Doucet-Boudreau.
The second conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that
we do not yet have a cohesive set of jurisdictional principles and remedial guidelines which will ensure that a person whose Charter rights
have been infringed will be granted a just and appropriate remedy in an
expeditious manner. While there have been substantial developments in
this area, especially in the past year, there are gaps in the law. In particular, statutory courts and administrative tribunals that have the duty to
abide by and apply the Constitution do not have the authority to grant
remedies that will do justice to a claimant. Consequently, decision makers that routinely deal with Charter issues cannot provide adequate relief, and claimants must either look to another forum for redress or go
without. The courts cannot provide a complete solution since the legislatures have exclusive authority to assign the jurisdiction of courts and
tribunals. However, the courts can point out the problem and urge the
legislatures to take up the issue in a manner that respects the division of
powers among the branches of government.
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